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IMPLICIT LIMITS ON AMENDING THE JAPANESE
CONSTITUTION
Adam N. Sterling
Abstract:
constitutional revision, and after attaining a two-thirds majority in both Houses of the
only hurdles to amending the Constitution of Japan are the amendment procedures
stipulated in Article 96. The plain text of Article 96 requires a two-thirds vote in both
Houses followed by popular referendum, but it poses no explicit limitations on the scope
of any amendment even the amendment process itself is fair game at first glance.
Nevertheless, Japanese scholars have claimed that limits must exist to Article 96, lest an
amendment destroy the Constitution itself. This Comment seeks to discover whether any
such implicit limits exist based on a comprehensive analysis of the text and structure of
the current Constitution as well as the Meiji Constitution. In so doing, this Comment
attempts to provide a roadmap for Japanese courts to assert the power of judicial review
over amendments that would do harm to the core values enshrined in the Constitution.
Cite as: Adam N. Sterling, Implicit Limits on Amending the Japanese Constitution, 28
WASH. INT L L.J. 243 (2019).

I.

INTRODUCTION
1

has generated no small volume of international scholarship.
Much of that scholarly contribution has focused on critiquing the many
substantive reforms sought by the majority Liberal Democratic Party
, 2 including revision of the Pacifism Clause in Article 9. 3 This

J.D., University of Washington School of Law, class of 2018. M.A. in Public Policy, D shisha
University, class of 2013. The author would like to thank Professors Larry Repeta, Dongsheng Zang, for
their support and advice, as well as the editorial staff of the Washington International Law Journal.
1
Drafting of the postwar Japanese Constitution began in late 1945, it was officially promulgated on
November 3, 1946, and it went into effect on May 3, 1947. See generally Birth of the Constitution of
Japan: Chronological Table, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/history.html (last
visited Sept. 4, 2018) (detailing major events throughout the process of creating the current constitution).
See Carl F. Goodman, Contemplated
, 26 WASH. INT L
L.J. 17, 18 (2017).
2
See Richard Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules, 13 INT L J. CONST. L. 655, 657
(2015); Goodman, supra note 1, at 19; Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional
, 40 FORDHAM INT L L.J. 427, 428 (2017).
3
See NIHONKOKU K
[K
] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9, para. 1 (Japan), http://www.ndl.go.jp/
[T]he Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
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4
Constitution the nickname
eace
spurring international
support for the renunciation of war as a goal for all humankind.5 Despite
such widespread support both within Japan and abroad,6 Article 9 has faced
repeated calls for amendment from conservative Japanese politicians.7 This
dynamic is compounded by the fact that, ever since 1955,
-party
position
parties unable to contend with the conservative LDP
-war history.8 As such
thus far has been less the result of opposition parties
than
economic priorities and bickering among factions within the LDP, all of
which have combined to effectively block any reform efforts.9 This debate
has once again been thrust into the international spotlight with Prime
to amend Article 9, along with the
entirety of the 1946 Constitution.10 The only constitutional barrier to these
proposed revisions is the amendment process in Article 96.

4
See, e.g., C. Douglas Lummis, We, the Japanese People: Rethinking the Meaning of the Peace
Constitution, ASIA-PAC. J. (2018), https://apjjf.org/-C--Douglas-Lummis/5118/article.pdf.
5
itution to be awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize. See D. McN.,
, ECONOMIST (May 14, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/05/keeping-the-peace.
6
See, e.g., Albert, supra note 2, at 675.
7
Id.; see also Michael A. Panton, Politics, Practice and Pacifism: Revising Article 9 of the
Japanese Constitution, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L & POL Y J. 163, 183 (2009).
8
See Samee Siddiqui, The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ): Prospects of a
Two-Party System in Japan, ALJAZEERA CTR. FOR STUD. 2 (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2013/2/25/2013225115850517734The%20Rise%20and%2
0Fall%20of%20the%20Democratic%20Party%20of%20Japan.pdf; Yuichiro Tsuji, Reflection of Public
Interest in the Japanese Constitution: Constitutional Amendment, 46 ENV. J. INT L L. & POL Y 159, 160 61
(2018)
parliament, known as the Diet, was from 2009 to 2011. See Siddiqui, supra, at 3. LDP dominance in
Japanese politics grew from the merger of two major conservative parties in 1955, which is why this
See Modern Japan in Archives: Establishment of 1955
System, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha6/index.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018);
Jayshree Bajoria, The Rise of Political Opposition in Japan, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rise-political-opposition-japan (last updated Aug. 31, 2009).
9
See FRANK O. MILLER, MINOBE T ATSUKICHI: INTERPRETER OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPAN 288
(1965); cf. Craig Martin, Binding the Dogs of War: Japan and the Constitutionalizing of Jus ad Bellum, 30
U. PA. J. INT L L. 267, 328
shield against pressure from the United States to remilitarize allowed the LDP to focus on economic growth
during the Cold War).
10
See Albert, supra note 2, at 660; Motoko Rich,
Pacifist Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/world/asia/japanconstitution-shinzo-abe-military.html. See generally Kenp kaisei s an o happy [Announcing the
Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution ], JIMIN NEWS (Liberal Democratic Party [LDP],
Japan), Apr. 27, 2012, https://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/recapture/pdf/063.pdf (providing a brief
outline of past reform efforts and describing how the proposed amendments would change the current
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Despite these persistent efforts to invoke the amendment process, the
Constitution has never actually been amended. 11 Article 96 of the
Constitution of Japan contains the following process for proposing and
adopting constitutional amendments:
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet,
through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the
members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the
people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote
of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum
or at such election as the Diet shall specify.
Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be
promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an
integral part of this Constitution.12
Faced with the daunting task of overcoming these constitutional barriers to
amendments, in early 2013, Prime Minister Abe responded by changing
tactics to focus on first amending the amendment process itself.13 The LDP
published its proposed revisions to the entirety of the 1946 Constitution in
Constitution); LDP Announces a New Draft Constitution for Japan, J
(May 7, 2012),
https://www.jimin.jp/english/news/117099.html. For an example of
efforts to persuade younger
Japanese of the need for constitutional revision, see Manga Pamphlet,
Honbu [LDP Headquarters for the Promotion of Revision of the Constitution], Honobono ikka no kenp
kaisei tte n ni? [The Honobono Family in What is a Constitutional Amendment?] (Apr. 2015),
http://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/pamphlet/kenoukaisei_manga_pamphlet.pdf.
11
See Albert, supra note 2, at 659. Popular support of Article 9 and opposition to constitutional
revision has resulted in the failure of any amendment proposals to ever actually materialize. See Lawrence
Repeta & Colin P.A. Jones,
and Possible Futures, in JAPAN: THE PRECARIOUS FUTURE 304, 307 (Frank Baldwin & Anne Allison eds.,
2015) (finding no record of the LDP ever submitting any amendment proposal to the Diet).
12
K
art. 96.
13
Prime Minister Abe did briefly retreat when faced with strong opposition from constitutional
scholars and others. See Editorial, LDP Out to Undermine Constitution, JAPAN T IMES (Apr. 18, 2013),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/18/editorials/ldp-out-to-undermine-constitution/. Scholars
organize symposia and protests across Japan. See Ishibashi Hideaki, Ga
[
A Call to Oppose
Revision for the House of Councillors Election], ASAHI SHINBUN (May 23, 2013, 8:21 PM),
http://digital.asahi.com/articles/TKY201305230274.htm
[http://blog.livedoor.jp/gataroclone/archives/
27376713.html]; Mizushima Asaho, 96-j no Kai hassoku Rikken shugi no teichaku ni mukete (1)
[Inauguration of the
Toward the Establishment of Constitutionalism (1)],
ASAHO.COM (May 27, 2013), http://www.asaho.com/jpn/bkno/2013/0527.html. For an overview of the
response from the academic community, see Okano Yayo,
and the Assault on Individual Rights, ASIA-PAC. J. 2 4 (Mar. 1, 2018), https://apjjf.org/-OkanoYayo/5519/article.pdf.
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2012. 14 The LDP Draft for the Amendment of the Constitution of Japan
Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by members
of the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors,
through a concurring vote of a majority of all the members of
each House, and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for
ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a
majority of all valid votes cast thereon, at a referendum as
specified by law.
Amendments when so ratified
promulgated by the Emperor.15

shall

immediately

be

Immediately, there is one substantive change that the proposed amendment
would effectuate lowering the initial barrier to constitutional amendment
from a supermajority to a simple majority vote in the Diet.16
Even though support for the initial LDP Draft has waned,17 the LDP
coalition recently surpassed
supermajority barrier in the 2016
and 2017 elections,18 prompting Prime Minister Abe to reignite discussions
14
For an overview of the problematic nature of the LDP Draft, Lawrence Repeta,
Democracy at Risk
, ASIA-PAC. J.
(July 14, 2013), https://apjjf.org/Lawrence-Repeta/3969/article.pdf; Repeta & Jones, supra note 11
(categorizing and critiquing the types of reforms contained in the LDP Draft).
15

Amendment of the Constitution of Japan] art. 100 (Apr. 27, 2012) (emphasis added),
https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/news/policy/130250_1.pdf, as translated in Draft for the Amendment of the
Constitution of Japan, VOYCE, https://www.voyce-jpn.com/ldp-draft-constitution (last updated Apr. 18,
2016) [hereinafter LDP Draft]; see also Tomohiro Osaki, LDP Sets Aside 2012 Draft Constitution Ahead of
Diet Debate on Revision, JAPAN T IMES (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2016/10/18/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-sets-aside-2012-draft-constitution-ahead-diet-debate-revision/
(describing how the LDP coalition achieved two-thirds of both houses in the 2016 election, but had
publicly stated that it will postpone any action on the 2012 draft).
16
Some of the other changes to Article 96 include simple clarifications of the proposal and voting
procedures, as well as a requirement that the votes be valid. Conspicuously omitted, however, is the final
portion stating that amendments are promulgated in the name of the people, as an integral part of this
Constitution. This omission is important to the extent that it would bring the new amendment process in
line with the overall objective of the LDP draft, which is to eliminate the people and return the Emperor
to semi-sovereign status. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 37 45; Yuichiro Tsuji, supra note 8, at 162.
17
See LDP Shelves Controversial Constitutional Draft, MAINICHI (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20161018/p2a/00m/0na/021000c.
18
See Leika Kihara & Linda Sieg,
Election Win, REUTERS (Oct. 21, 2017, 4:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-election/abe-topush-reform-of-japans-pacifist-constitution-after-election-win-idUSKBN1CQ0UW. The first electoral
For an explanation of

January 2019

Implicit Limits on Amending the Japanese Constitution

247

on amending the Constitution. 19 Nevertheless, even with supermajority
control over both Houses, neither the public nor the House of Councillors is
solidly in support of amending the Constitution. 20 So long as Article 96
remains intact,
-time goal
remains
. Starting with small amendments, the Diet
can codify new constitutional rights that are more likely to garner public
support. 21 Accordingly, LDP can build toward lowering the amendment
threshold in Article 96 to finally push through the more controversial
changes. Although such a strategy appears more politically viable, it
inevitably raises more troubling questions. For example, if the Diet could
pass regular legislation under the same vote threshold as amendments, is the
Constitution still the supreme law of the land? What would happen to other
provisions in the Constitution that still require a two-thirds majority? And
can a constitutional amendment legitimately repeal fundamental components
of the Constitution of Japan?
This Comment aims to provide answers to these questions by
attempting to identify implicit limits to the amendment process under Article
96. Rather than applying a purely theoretical approach based on constituent
Abenomics, see Abenomics, JAPANGOV, https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/index.html. The second
electoral victory was more in response to the looming threat of North Korea. See Masazumi Wakatabe, A
Snap Election in Japan May Endanger Abenomics, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2017, 10:20 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mwakatabe/2017/09/21/snap-election-japan-endanger-abenomics-shinzoabe/; Anthony Fensom, Japan Election Victory Gives Abe Mandate for Reform, DIPLOMAT (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/japan-election-victory-gives-abe-mandate-for-reform/.
19
See New Draft Constitution to Be Submitted to Parliament PM Abe, JAPAN FORWARD (June 26,
2017, 5:06 PM), https://japan-forward.com/under-the-flag-of-constitution-revision-prime-minister-aberesolves-to-go-on-the-offensive/. Prime Minister Abe has stated that he expects to have a new draft
constitution ready in time for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. See Leo Lewis, Abe Sets 2020 Target to Revise
, FIN. T IMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/a4d2aaa0-2fd9-11e79555-23ef563ecf9a. In the newest round of talks, the primary focus was reconciling the goal of legitimizing
-Defense Force with efforts to maintain certain popular aspects of Article 9. See Memorandum,
J
DP Headquarters for the Promotion of Revision of the
Constitution], Jimint
Constitutional Amendments] (Dec. 20, 2017) https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/news/policy/136448_1.pdf.
The two possibilities identified in regard to Article 9 are to eliminate entirely the second clause which
forbids Japan from maintaining any war potential consistent with the 2012 LDP Draft, or to retain both
clauses while explicitly recognizing the Self-Defense Force as an exception. Id.
20
See
, MAINICHI (June 25,
2016), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160625/p2a/00m/0na/013000c (finding on 55% of all
candidates for the 2016 House of Councillors election in favor of constitutional revision); Nearly 70%
Oppose Diet Actions Directed at Constitutional Revision in 2018: Survey, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/16/national/nearly-70-oppose-plans-propose-constitutionalamendment-diet-2018-poll/.
21
See, e.g., LDP Draft, supra note 15, art. 19-2 (protecting the privacy of personal information); id.
art. 25-2 (protecting the environment).
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power and other abstract concepts,22 this Comment will attempt to provide
concrete arguments that Japanese courts could potentially rely on to assert
the power of judicial review over an allegedly unconstitutional constitutional
amendment. In reality, because Article 96 has never been successfully
invoked, this area of the law is very much a blank slate. As such, this
Comment will address the constitutional interpretation issue from first
principles by employing a comprehensive approach. Arguments will focus
particularly on the text and structure of the 1946 Constitution as well as its
predecessor, the Meiji Constitution, while looking to some contemporaneous
drafting history to provide context.23 Due to the influence of American legal
concepts in the Japanese Constitution, 24 the Supreme Court of Japan has
relied on U.S. Supreme Court cases in many instances, 25 and the author for
practical reasons as well will do the same.

22
See, e.g., Yaniv Roznai, Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty: Linking
Unamendability and Amendment Procedures, in THE FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 23 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2017).
23
meaning
the text can reasonably bear. Cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989) (Scalia, J.,

see
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 33 (2012)
y competent in the
school of thought necessarily exists in Japan. Instead, the author relies on textualist canons of construction
as a means of persuasive authority more capable of translating between different legal cultures.
24
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 35 (2011); cf.
Hideo Tanaka, Impact of Foreign Law in Japan: American Law, 14 CONTEMP. L. 287 (1966), as translated
in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 245, 251 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976) (noting the strong influence of
American law generally in many Japanese laws). German legal concepts have also played a major role in
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra, at 35
influence also remained. The modern constitutional history of Japan can be said to be an implantation of
A
cf. id. at 154
S
TATSUO, K
[PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION] 56680 (1982) (relying heavily on German
constitutional theories, particularly those of Carl Schmitt, to describe implicit limits on Article 96).
25
Because Japan is a civil law country and judicial precedent is technically not binding on other
courts, scholarly opinions can be treated as equally if not more persuasive. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra
note 24, at 23 24. Perhaps due to this lack of a legal tradition of citing precedent, judges frequently fail to
provide citations in their decisions, even when quoting entire passages verbatim. See THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 59 n.23. Nevertheless, there are several examples of cases in which Justices on
the Supreme Court of Japan have directly referenced U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g.
Saibansh
S
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANRE
[M
] 270,
96, 247 S
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSH [SAISH MIJI] 39, (Chiba, J., concurring) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936)); cf. Sup. Ct. Sept. 10, 1975
48 (a) 910, 29 S
SAIBANSHO KEIJI
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One of the most recent and in-depth examinations of Article 96 and
implicit limits on amending the Constitution of Japan is
article, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules. 26 While noting that
Article 96 itself is not explicitly entrenched against amendment, Albert
evaluates and rejects three potential arguments for implicit entrenchment,
including judicial review. 27 Nevertheless, t
primarily to provide an example of a present controversy. 28 In closing,
Albert acknowledges the shortcomings in his analysis and notes that more
history and failed subsequent amendment efforts.29 This Comment will build
on
employing a comprehensive analysis to uncover
whether implicit limits on Article 96 exist that a Japanese court could rely on
to justify striking down an unconstitutional amendment.30 In particular, this
comment will focus on textual bases within the Constitution albeit outside
of Article 96 as well as historical context to delineate the metes and
restrain governmental abuses of power, every constitution must be
interpreted against its own unique history and legal culture.31

[K

] 489, (Kishi, J., concurring)

26
Albert, supra note 2. Richard Albert is a Professor of Law at the University of Texas at Austin and
writes about comparative constitutional law. See RICHARD ALBERT, http://richardalbert.com/ (last visited
May 23, 2018).
27
Albert, supra note 2, at 666
Id. at 658. This Comment is
primarily
28
Id. at 657 58.
29
Id. at 685.
30
This is all assuming, however, that the Supreme Court of Japan will in fact exercise its power of
judicial review. The Court is notoriously conservative and generally has been willing to defer to the Diet in
all but the most extreme cases almost sixty years after its inception, the Court has declared only a handful
of parliamentary actions unconstitutional. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 145 47. In many

standing or political question doctrines. See id. at 134 40; Shigenori Matsui, Why Is the Japanese Supreme
Court So Conservative?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375, 1382 88 (2011). But cf. John O. Haley, Constitutional
Adjudication in Japan: Context, Structures, and Values, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1467 (2011) (arguing that the
tal factors). For an in& Jordan T. Wada, Comment, Can the Japanese Supreme Court Overcome the Political Question Hurdle?,
26 WASH. INT L L.J. 349 (2017).
31
Cf. KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION
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Part II of this Comment will pick up where Albert
left off.
It will begin with a brief note on the drafting history of Article 96 and its
relevance, followed by a reexamination of the only proposed constitutional
amendment in Japanese history the 1946 Constitution itself. Scholarly
views in Japan and other countries on the topic of implicit amendment limits
are also briefly summarized as a potential source of persuasive authority.
Part III will identify the structural and textual keys to understanding the
implicit limits on what can and cannot be amended via Article 96. Finally,
Part IV will synthesize the limitations identified in Part III to uncover how
those provisions would constrain efforts to amend the amendment process
itself. In doing so, this Comment attempts to transform the dialog
surrounding the debate over Article 96 in Japan and provide concrete, textbased arguments for recognizing implicit limits on the amendment process.
II.

ARTICLE 96 AND CURRENT ARGUMENTS IN THE DEBATE OVER IMPLICIT
LIMITS ON THE AMENDMENT PROCESS
A.

Background on the Adoption of the 1946 Constitution and the
Drafting History of Article 96

Drafting history can be an invaluable tool in deciphering the intended
meaning of complex and sometimes ambiguous constitutional provisions.
This is particularly the case with the U.S. Constitution, as the Federalist
Papers and the recorded debates in the Constitutional Convention provide a
treasure trove of context. 32 However,
situation counsel against placing much weight on the drafting history. First
of all, legislative history is generally disfavored as a source of law in
Japanese courts. 33 Second, and more importantly, due to the complicated
circumstances surrounding the 1946 Constituti
ion began with the end of World
War II. After the unconditional surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945,
General Douglas MacArthur was placed in charge of efforts to democratize

32
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA S CONSTITUTION 5 53 (2005) (describing the
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the U.S. Constitution).
33
See Tanaka, supra note 24, at 97 98. For the purposes of this Comment, this reality more than
answers the question of whether drafting history should be given any credence.
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Japanese society. 34 Under the direction of the Occupation
35
Headquarters
large-scale legal reforms commenced, and it soon
became clear that revising the Meiji Constitution would be necessary to
36
The Japanese government responded by
establishing a committee to look into potential amendments to the Meiji
Constitution.37 However, the initial draft crafted by the Diet, also known as
the Matsumoto Draft, proposed only minor changes in wording to the Meiji
Constitution and would have kept most of the Imperial structure intact. 38
When a newspaper leaked the conservative Matsumoto Draft to the public, it
s both from Japanese citizens and
39
the GHQ. Around that same time, various other scholarly associations and
political parties also prepared drafts to replace the Meiji Constitution. 40
Fearing that the
consisting of eleven of
the Allied Powers and not just the United States41 would dilute
influence and
the Japanese
government was unable to adopt a sufficiently liberal constitution, General
MacArthur decided that the GHQ must provide its own draft.42
43

proceeded to draft a new constitution
over a span of eight days and presented it to the Japanese

34
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 13; Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Outline: Part 1
Military
Defeat
and
Efforts
to
Reform
the
Constitution,
NAT L
DIET
LIBR.,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/outline/01outline.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
35
While General MacArthur and by extension his office is usually referred to in U.S. literature

refers to him and his sta
the Japanese convention.
36
SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 13 14; see also KOSEKI S
, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN S
POSTWAR CONSTITUTION 7 10 (Ray A. Moore trans., Westview Press 2018) (1989) (describing the
circumstances where General MacArthur first suggested the need for constitutional revision to Prince
Konoe Fumimaro).
37
SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 14.
38
Id.
39
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 60 61; cf. id. at 57 60 (comparing the Matsumoto Draft
with the Meiji Constitution).
40
In contrast, to the Matsumoto Draft, other groups and scholars did not rely exclusively on the
Meiji Constitution and did examine foreign constitutions for their drafts. Id. at 62. For an overview of the
various Japanese drafts, see id. at 26 48.
41
See id. at 68 69.
42
See id. at 77; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 14; Hideo Tanaka, A History of the
Constitution of Japan of 1946, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 653, 661 (describing the
criminal).
43
Memorandum from Charles L. Kades et al. to Chief of GHQ Government Section, Constitution of
Japan (Feb. 12, 1946), reproduced in Birth of the Constitution of Japan: GHQ Draft, February 13, 1946,
NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/076shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018)
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government on February 15, 1946. 44 While the drafters were undoubtedly
influenced by their own familiarity with the U.S. Constitution,45 the GHQ
also relied heavily on drafts submitted by Japanese scholars and other
Japanese authors.46 Despite its rushed nature, the GHQ Draft represented key
compromises to satisfy Japanese obligations under the Potsdam Declaration
and the
expectations, which may have imposed its own constitutional
draft should Japan have not adopted one. 47 After the GHQ Draft was
accepted by the Japanese government,48 work began on translating the draft
into Japanese,49 and it was published in full on April 17.50 The final election
under the Meiji Constitution was conducted on April 10,51 and deliberations
on the GHQ Draft lasted 114 days until it was approved by the Imperial Diet
on October 7. 52 While in the Imperial Diet, the draft underwent several

[hereinafter GHQ Draft]. Many of the documents central to the drafting of the Japanese Constitution are
Birth of the Constitution of Japan, NAT L DIET
LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/index.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). For ease of reference,
direct citations to the various documents will be omitted in favor of directing readers to the main exhibit
pages from which the referenced documents can be accessed. Further specifications will be provided for
pages that contain multiple documents.
44
SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 15. While technically accurate, this description fails to fully
appreciate the co
see KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 68 94; THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN S
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 55 88 (2000).
45
The chapter on individual rights in particular was heavily influenced by the U.S. Constitution. See
MATSUI, supra note 24, at 154.
46
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 70; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 18 21;
MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 98 100;
January 11, 1946, NAT L DIET LIBR.,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/060shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018) (indicating that the
ee
,
NAT L
DIET
LIBR.,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/02/052shoshi.html (last updated May 3, 2004) [hereinafter CIA
Draft].
47
See Hideo Tanaka, supra note 42, at 657 58.
48
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 111 (suggesting that the Japanese government adopted the
But see id.
49
For more on this process and substantive changes that resulted from translation of the GHQ Draft,
see id. at 111 22.
50
Id. at 133.
51
Id. at 165.
52
Id. at 208. That is not to imply that the draft constitution was debated by the full Diet for all 114
days. Instead, the draft was first examined by the Privy Council over eleven sessions, then sent to a special
committee for deliberations, followed by nearly a month of secret meetings in a subcommittee for
incorporating all of the proposed changes. Id. at 168 69; see also Birth of the Constitution of Japan:
Deliberations in the Imperial Diet, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/outline/
04outline.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
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revisions,53 including the socle 9.54 The
new Constitution was promulgated by the Emperor on November 3, 1946,
and took effect on May 3, 1947.55 One year later, the Diet was provided with
an opportunity to amend the Constitution, and yet, no action was taken.56 In
summary, the 1946 Constitution is more properly viewed as a collaborative
effort, reflecting the ideas of various drafters, both Japanese and American.57
Focusing more narrowly on the drafting history of Article 96, early
proposals from the GHQ drafters would have foreclosed any amendment for
the first ten years or would have explicitly entrenched the provisions on
individual rights against amendment. 58 The original proposal would also
have erected much higher thresholds for amendments, requiring a threefourths vote in the Diet followed by two-thirds in a public referendum.59 In
the deletion of those explicit entrenchment provisions from the GHQ Draft.60
There was one other provision in the GHQ Draft that would have prohibited
the Diet from overriding Supreme Court decisions on individual rights,
although it is unclear why that compromise was not included in the final
Constitution.61 Except for slight changes in language to reflect the decision

53

See KOSEKI S

, supra note 36, at 165 88 (discussing Diet deliberations on compulsory

54

See id. at 192 95. The Ashida Amendment arguably allowed for Japan
for the purpose of selfid.
accomplish[ing] the aim
of the preceding paragraph ; K
, art. 9, para. 2.
55
KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 208.
56
See id. at 243 51; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 21.
57
See J. Patrick Boyd,
, J. ASIA-PAC. STUD.,
Mar. 2014, at 47, 50 51; cf. KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 4 (describing the 1946 Constitution as a
SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 21 (rejecting the notion that the Constitution was
58

See MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 73.
Birth of the Constitution of Japan: GHQ Original Draft: Original Drafts of Committee Reports,
NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/147/147_007l.html (last visited Sept. 4,
2018) (draft of the Committee of the Emperor and Miscellaneous Affairs) (emphasis added).
60
MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 74.
61
Id.
59

Supreme Court decisions by a two-thirds vote. See GHQ Draft, supra note 43, art. LXXIII.
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to retain a bicameral legislature,62 the amendment process proposed in the
final GHQ Draft remained largely unchanged throughout the process.63
Given this drafting history, it may be tempting to treat General
tion to remove the proposed entrenchment provisions
from Article 96 as definitive proof that no limits exist. However, placed in
context, such a presumption would grossly overstate the actions of a single
individual who had no other role in the drafting process. Furthermore, it
would be erroneous to ascribe much weight to any of the
actions when the drafting process was conducted largely in secret, 64 and
most
drafting the
1946 Constitution until years after its adoption, due to censorship during the
Occupation.65 Of course, because the explicit entrenchment provisions were
never presented to the Japanese government in the first place, it is equally
true that th
adoption of the amendment process contained in the
GHQ Draft neither confirms nor denies the existence of limits on
permissible amendments. In light of the similarities between the amendment
process in the Meiji Constitution and the GHQ Draft, it is equally plausible
66
Because
67
deliberations in the Diet were also conducted in secret, attempting to
discern
.
Nevertheless, of the few debate records that do exist,68 little mention is made
of Article 96 or the amendment process.69

62
Compare GHQ Draft, supra note 43, art. XLI, with K
, art. 42. There is some indication that
the unicameral Diet was also intended as a bargaining chip. See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 91.
63
Compare GHQ Draft, supra note 43, art. LXXXIX, with K
, art. 96.
64
See Hideo Tanaka, supra note 24, at 660 n.9.
65
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 1; cf. MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 86 88 (listing the
reasons why the GHQ preferred to keep its role in the drafting process a secret).
66
For glimpses at the various minor modifications to Article 96 that occurred through each round of
drafting and translation, see 3 S
TATSUO, NIHONKOKU K
SEIRITSUSHI 32, 89 90, 148, 415, 488 89
(Sato Isao ed., 1994). Similarities between the Meiji and 1946 Constitutions are addressed next. See infra
Section II.B.
67
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 169 (noting that minutes of the secret subcommittee
meetings were not even released to the public until 1995).
68
The National D
conducted in the Diet. See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Records of the Privy Council Committee,
April to May 1946, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/111_1shoshi.html (last
visited Sept. 4, 2018); Record of the Examination Committee of Privy Council on the Bill for Revision of
the Imperial Constitution After the Decision in the 90th Session, October 19, 1946, NAT L DIET LIBR.,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/129_1shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
69
Although the Privy Council had little to say about the amendment process, in its discussion on
Chapters IX, X, and XI, several members did express a desire to eliminate Chapter X as unnecessary. See
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This complex drafting history begs the question of whose intent
controls when interpreting the 1946 Constitution: The foreign Occupation
forces in the GHQ whose draft became the foundation for the 1946
Constitution? The government translators who sought to reinsert aspects of
the Meiji Constitution when preparing the Japanese version of the GHQ
Draft before the Diet even began deliberations?70 The conservative-majority
legislature,71 elected before the final government draft was even published,
that adopted the new Constitution primarily in order to ensure the safety of
the institution of the Emperor? 72 Or the subsequent legislatures 73 that
declined to propose any amendments, even when explicitly given the
chance?74 Unlike the open drafting history of the U.S. Constitution,75 it is
difficult to draw any specific inferences about contemporary understanding
of the 1946 Constitution from the statements of these actors. Quite possibly
the only commonality among the various drafters was a desire to ensure
76
The
significance of these similarities to the Meiji Constitution will be examined
further in Part III.
Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Records of the Privy Council Committee, April to May 1946, NAT L
DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/111_1shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018)
(statements of Irie Toshio & Minobe Tatsukichi on May 15, 1946). And yet, Chapter X was adopted intact.
70
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 111 16; cf. id. at 132 (noting that groups who advocated
for only minor changes to the Meiji Constitution supported the March 6 Japanese draft, whereas those who
sought more substantial reform expressed criticism).
71
See id.
the Liberal Party,
predecessor of the LDP).
72
See id. at 166 67.
73
Perhaps some significance can also be drawn from the fact that the public arguably rebuked the
ty its first and
only electoral win in the April 25, 1947 general election, just prior to the new Constitution coming into
force. See Dai 23[The 23rd General Election], S
MAINICHI,
http://showa.mainichi.jp/news/1947/04/23-4701.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2018).
74

constitutional review was mandated by the FEC. See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Far Eastern
the Review of a New Japanese Constitution, NAT L DIET LIBR.,
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/05/129shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018); MCNELLY, supra
note 44, at 25 28; cf. KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 141 61 (catalog
policy clashes with the FEC).
75
Which included direct public participation in state conventions as well as a rich dialog on the
functions of the new Constitution in the Federalist Papers. See AMAR, supra note 32, at 14 15.
76
KOSEKI S
, supra note 36
constitution); see also id.
Japanese legal bureau
id. at 57
Principles); id.
When drafting history is particularly ambiguous, much as with legis
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971).
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Discerning the Permissible Scope of Amendments from
Historical Practice

Before returning to the text of Article 96, historical practice can also
shed light on potential implicit limitations to the amendment process. While
many contemporary constitutions77 explicitly place limits on the scope of
78
largenothing within the 1946 Constitution supports such
79
a distinction. If anything, the plain text of Article 96 supports the
contention that the same procedure was intended to apply to all amendments,
whether total revisions or minor adjustments. 80 Such an understanding
would coincide with Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which also makes no
distinction between amendments and revisions.81

Nevertheless, the format and scope of subsequent amendments can be
heavily influenced by the format of prior amendments. Thus, when the Bill
of Rights was adopted by the several states in the process of ratifying the
U.S. Constitution, those first ten amendments served as a template for all
future amendments.82 In the Japanese context, however, there have been no
successful amendments to the Japanese Constitution since its adoption in

77
See Albert, supra note 2, at 667 n.105 (citing Austria, Spain, and Switzerland as examples of
countries that contain such a distinction and impose differing thresholds). For example, Article 44 of the
Austrian Constitution prescribes three tiers of amendment: regular constitutional amendments can be
passed by a twoaddition to a two-thirds vote of the National Council;

partial revisions only must follow the referendum process if a one-third of the National Council so requests.
BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [CONSTITUTION] BGBL No. 1/1930, art. 44(3) (Austria).
78

supra note 2, at 667.
79
kaisei), and only in three locations. See
K
art. 7 (Imperial promulgation); id. art. 16 (individual right to petition); id. art. 96 (amendment
process). Furthermore, no distinction is drawn between smaller, more technical amendments and larger,
wide-reaching revisions
this fact and noted that even those Japanese political actors opposed to amending the Constitution have not
contemplated this argument. Albert, supra note 2, at 668 n.111.
80
Compare B-VG art. 44(3) (imposing the two-thirds vote threshold only for larger revisions), with
K
art. 96 (requiring a two-thirds vote and public referendum for any amendment).
81
See U.S. CONST. art. V; United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 730 32 (1931) (rejecting an
argument that amendments to the U.S. Constitution affecting personal liberties must be referred to the
people instead of passed via ratification by state legislatures).
82
For some specific examples of recurring structure and language, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §
2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 2.
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1946.83 The closest Japan has come to amending the 1946 Constitution was
arguably in 1957 when the LDP-led government established a commission
to explore potential amendments, and yet, seven years later, those efforts
resulted in no specific proposals. 84 The sole amendment to the Meiji
Constitution was the 1946 Constitution itself, which was in fact adopted and
ratified via the amendment process prescribed by Article 73 of the Meiji
Constitution:85
When it has become necessary in future to amend the
provisions of the present Constitution, a project to that effect
shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.
In the above case, neither House can open the debate, unless not
less than two thirds of the whole number of Members are
present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of
not less than two thirds of the Members present is obtained.86
The process itself employs an identical supermajority requirement as that
contained in Article 96 of the 1946 Constitution.87 Of further interest here is
that the Meiji Constitution expressly contained two limitations on the
amendment process.
o modification of the Imperial
House Law shall be required to be submitted to the deliberation of the
Imperial Diet 88 in essence shielding the Emperor and rules of succession
from alteration via regular legislation or amendment. 89 Article 75 further
stipulates that [n]o modification can be introduced into the Constitution, or
into the Imperial House Law, during the time of a Regency. 90

83

Although Japanese politicians have used this fact to argue for amending Article 96, the current
supra note 2, at 659; see also
SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 262 65.
84
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 262 63; cf. Repeta & Jones, supra note 11, at 307
(finding no specific amendment to ever have been officially proposed in the Diet).
85
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 21.
86
DAI NIHON T EIKOKU K
[MEIJI K
] [CONSTITUTION], art. 73 (Japan),
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
87
Key differences from the 1946 Constitution are the lack of any popular referendum requirement
Compare id., with K
, art. 96.
88
MEIJI K
art. 74.
89
The Japanese term used here is kaisei
Id.
90
Id.
while the Emperor is absent or otherwise incapacitated, or until the Emperor comes of age. See Regent,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regent (last updated Mar. 20, 2018);
see also K
art. 5 (describing the effects of a regency); K shitsu tenpan [Imperial House Law], Law No.
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The question then is whether
amendment can rewrite the entire
Constitution. By historical practice it did, so the answer must be yes. 91
However, this
exception can be interpreted both broadly and
narrowly. Broadly speaking, the 1946 Constitution overwrote the Meiji
Constitution in its entirety including its primary structural pillar of placing
the Emperor as the sovereign92 while nominally following the procedures
in Article 73.93 This precedent would suggest that if a new constitution is
proposed, it need merely attain the minimum requirements of an ordinary
amendment to effectively replace the current Constitution in its entirety.94
However, such a broad reading overlooks certain facts that tend to
undercut the apparent logic in its simplicity. For example, the same basic act
of rewriting the entire Constitution could only be accomplished otherwise by
individually amending each provision, a process that would be impeded by
any explicit or implicit limits to the amendment process itself. Such a
allow more time for deliberation of every single provision prior to enactment.
While neither Constitution explicitly forbids the consideration of multiple
amendments at the same time, no provision expressly provides that such
lesser
amendments.95 Furthermore, historical context played an immeasurable role
3 of 1947, art. 16 (requiring a regent when the Emperor is a minor or when the Emperor is mentally or
physically unable to perform the required duties).
91
This oversimplifies the debate over the legitimacy of the act of promulgating an entirely new
constitution as an amendment. For a summary of Japanese scholarly theories on the significance of this
enactment history, see infra Section II.D.3.
92
See, e.g., MEIJI K
art. 4 (Japan) (designating the Emperor as the sovereign and head of Japan).
93

Birth of the Constitution
of Japan: The Constitution of Japan, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html
(last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
94

See Repeta & Jones, supra note 11,
at 304; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 264. For an overview of recent efforts to draft a new
constitution, see CHRISTIAN G. WINKLER, THE QUEST FOR JAPAN S NEW CONSTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF
VISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM PROPOSALS 1980 2009, at 94 133 (2011). For a comparison of
ta
-taihi.pdf.
Interestingly, the initial 2004 LDP draft outline suggested amending Article 96 to provide two pathways for
adopting amendments: either with a two-thirds vote in both houses and no public referendum, or with a
simple majority in both houses followed by a simple majority in a public referendum. Id. at 24.
95
Thi
and is can be expressly found in other near-contemporaneous constitutions. See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN
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in prompting the adoption of
in Japan. The Meiji
Constitution was the ultimate fruit of years of civil war followed by efforts
to abolish the prior feudal system and to reinstate the Emperor as the leader
of a unified Japan,96 while the 1946 Constitution came as a direct result of
97
These two constitutions
arose amid similar circumstances equivalent to revolutions, complete with
shifts in the locus of sovereign power from the Tokugawa shogunate to the
Emperor, and then from the Emperor to the people. Some may suggest that,
absent such revolutionary circumstances, a complete constitutional revision
would be impermissible. 98
amendment exception is unlikely to garner much support from the courts.99
Progressively narrower readings would posit that even a wholesale
rewriting of the Constitution, while permissible via the regular amendment
process, must still abide by those limits already placed on the amendment
process. In the case of the Meiji Constitution, the only applicable explicit
limit100 on the constitutional amendment process in Article 73 was that no

ESPAÑOLA [C.E.] [CONSTITUTION] B.O.E. n. 168, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain) (requiring additional procedures
96
97
98

See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 7 10.
See id. at 12 16.
See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 9, at 288 (attributing anti-

p
the works of political theorists such as Carl Schmidt); id.
constitution] has as its premise the basic upheaval in our political structure brought by our acceptance of
the Potsdam Declaration terms . . . [and] it is only on this basis that it can be thought to be constitutionally
MIYAZAWA TOSHIYOSHI, KOKUMIN SHUKEN NO TEN
[POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE EMPEROR SYSTEM] 93 94 (1957)); cf. MASATOMO KODAMA, THE DAWN OF A NEW
CONSTITUTION 96 (Carl Freire trans., 2015) (likening the situation surrounding the adoption of the 1946
M ILLER, supra note 9, at 276 (discussing the August Revolution
MINOBE TATSUKICHI, NIHONKOKU K
[PRINCIPLES
118 19 (1948)).
99
To be clear, Albert approaches this theoretical limitation on the amendment process as a question
of political practice to be self-governed by political actors themselves. However, there is no indication, if
or for that matter
that it would not be judicially enforceable. The ultimate
measure is legitimacy of the processes in the eyes of the people, which arguably may fall under some
broader conception of what procedures are required, which would be judicially reviewable.
100
Notably,
of the
Constitution except
MEIJI K
pmbl.
The Japanese word used here is funk , essentially meaning to recklessly alter or revise in a disorderly
OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION]

fashion. See Funk , KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/word/
-623136 (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). See
Section II.D.3 for further discussion of the importance of the Preamble.
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amendment may take place while a regency is in effect.101 As this was not an
issue when the 1946 Constitution was promulgated,102 it is arguable that the
wholesale revision of the Constitution in 1946 was permissible because it
complied not only with the literal amendment process in Article 73 but with
the explicit restrictions in Article 75 as well.103 At its absolute narrowest, the
historical exception for a wholesale revision would further be limited to
only those extreme circumstances that brought about the Meiji Constitution
in 1889 and the 1946 Constitution.104 Such a reading essentially restates the
truism that no constitutional provision . . . can survive revolution. 105
Without delving too deeply into either extreme, it would appear that a
middle-of-the-road approach would best encapsulate the scope of this
historical exception
Constitution must
follow the same processes and restrictions as the
amendment
process, similar to what occurred in 1946. However, faced with a revolution
or some other exigent crisis, even explicitly entrenched provisions may pose
no barrier to total constitutional revision. Applying this approach to the
proposed LDP Draft, 106 it becomes clear that, barring some particularly
extreme circumstances,
at the very least must
comply with any textual limitations to the amendment process. Part III will
attempt to uncover what those implicit or explicit limits might be.

101
MEIJI K
art. 75. Because the Imperial House Law was itself not at issue, the other explicit
limit on the amendment power was not in play. See id. art. 74.
102
See Birth of the
Constitution of Japan, supra note 93.
103

f 1889 now
existing . . . .
Constitution Draft, June 21, 1946, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/04/
116shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
104
Ironically, this argument encapsulated by the August Revolution theory is precisely the
majority view among scholars in Japan. See discussion infra Section II.D.3.
105
Richard Albert, The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution, in COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 13, 14 n.8. (András Koltay ed., 2015),
lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1985&context=lsfp.
106
With a twoc
approach should public opinion hold steady. But see Hiroyuki Tanaka & Hiroshi Odanaka, Ruling Bloc to
Put Off Plan to Pass Bill to Revise Constitutional Referendum Act, MAINICHI (July 4, 2018),
https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180704/p2a/00m/0na/032000c (discussing a setback in revising the
referendum procedures for proposed amendments).
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The Availability of Judicial Review to Invalidate an Allegedly
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment

Another barrier to challenging the constitutionality of an amendment
is the constitutional scope of judicial review.107 The power of judicial review
is expressly enshrined in Article 81 of the 1946 Constitution
Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality
of any law, order, regulation or official act 108 The term shobun, translated
usually involving the application of law to facts in order to determine how
something or someone should be dealt with.109 The only other instance of the
term shobun is in Article 78, which prohibi
action against
110
A necessary corollary to
Article 81 is the Supremacy Clause in Article 98, which
no
law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof,
contrary to the [Constitution], shall have legal force or validity. 111 A key
difference here is the much more expansive
clause, which would reach any other
or
a much broader term
susceptible to circular definition even in Japanese. 112 The term
also
appears in several other provisions.113 Of course, because the Diet has never
proposed an amendment to begin with, there is no precedent from the
Supreme Court that clearly answers whether one would be reviewable as an
114

107
Although Albert dismissed judicial review as an option to challenge an amendment to Article 96,
his analysis presumed the constitutional availability of judicial review for an amendment, and his dismissal
was based on the likelihood that Japanese courts would exercise judicial constraint based on prudential
concerns. See Albert, supra note 2, at 672. This Comment is less concerned with whether a court will
exercise its power which depends more on the composition of the Supreme Court than whether it can.
108
K
art. 81 (emphasis added).
109
110
111
112

See Shobun, KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/word/
K
art. 78 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 98.
See

, KOTOBANK, https://kotobank.jp/word/

-535108 (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).

-61390 (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) (meaning
,
with a particular focus on criminal law, see Okamura Harunobu,
[The Basis
of Act Theory in Criminal Law], 29 T
L. REV. 1, 2 (1986), http://id.nii.ac.jp/1060/00003588/.
113
See K
arts. 3, 4, 5, 7, 17, 20, 39.
114
One interesting side note in assessing the intended scope of judicial review in Japan is the fact that
the GHQ Draft contained a provision that would have allowed the Diet to overrule a Supreme Court
decision with a supermajority vote, and yet that provision was not included in the final text of the 1948
Constitution. See THEODORE MCNELLY, THE ORIGINS OF JAPAN S DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 74 (2000);
Hideo Tanaka, A History of the Constitution of Japan of 1946, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra
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The Sunakawa case115 is instructive in this instance not only because it
involves Article 9 and the birth of the political question doctrine 116 in Japan,
but because it involves a constitutional challenge to a treaty, judicial review
of which is not addressed in either Article 81 or 98.117 Instead, treaties are
mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 98, stipulating
treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be
faithfully observed. 118 This special treatment has prompted some scholars
to argue that treaties are therefore superior to the Constitution itself, or at
least supersede any statutes in conflict.119 The answer to whether treaties are
reviewable, thus, may bear on the question of whether a court could
potentially review a constitutional amendment.
The Sunakawa case involved a constitutional challenge to a criminal
law enacted to enforce provisions of the Japan-United States Security
Treaty if the treaty itself violated Article 9, then so did those criminal
provisions. A unanimous Court albeit with multiple concurring opinions
held
the question of whether the treaty was in accord with the
Constitution was carefully discussed by both Houses and finally ratified by
the Diet as being a legal and proper treaty. 120
extremely high
degree of political consideration, having bearing upon the very existence of
[Japan] as a sovereign power, the Court declared that, unless the said
note 42, at 37 n.6. One possibility for the initial inclusion of this option was a general distrust among U.S.
scholars and politicians at the time of activist courts overturning beneficial legislation. See MCNELLY,
supra, at 74; cf, Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT L J. CONST. L.
upo
Lochner-era jurisprudence). Although it is
possible that these concerns may have been alleviated by the other restrictions imposed on judicial
appointees. See K
art. 79, para. 2 (providing for popular review of appointments); id. para. 5 (affixing
a mandatory retirement age).
115
See T HE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 709 11 (summarizing the background facts
and majority opinion).
116
For an in-depth explanation and critical examination
, see generally Chen & Wada, supra note 30.
117
In contrast, the Supremacy Clause as initially proposed by committee prior to completion of the
the Land, and no law, ordinance, treaty or other governmental act contrary to the provisions thereof shall
Birth of the Constitution of Japan: GHQ Original Draft: Original Drafts of
Committee Reports, supra note 59 (emphasis added) (draft of the Committee of the Emperor and
Miscellaneous Affairs).
118
K
art. 98, para. 2.
119
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 28 29 (noting that most scholars agree with the second
contention).
120
Sakata v. Japan, Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1959, Sh 34 (a) no. 710, 13 K
3225, 3234, translated in
1959 (A) (710), SUP. CT. JAPAN, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=13 (last visited Nov. 24,
2018) [hereinafter Sunakawa].
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treaty is obviously unconstitutional and void, it falls outside the purview of
the power of judicial review granted to the court. 121 In the normal sense
the determination of
constitutionality
should be left primarily to the Cabinet which has the power to conclude
treaties and the Diet which has the power to ratify them; and ultimately to
the political consideration of the people with whom rests the sovereign
power of the nation. 122 Because the security treaty in question was not
unconstitutional, the Court exercised judicial restraint under its
political question doctrine and stopped short of reaching the merits.
81, the
Sunakawa Court nevertheless concluded that even highly political treaties
obviously unconstitutional and void
As the concurring opinion of Justice Tarumi acknowledged, the majority in
fact did engage in a superficial review if only to determine whether further
inquiry was required.123 The Court did not, however, specify how it is that
treaties fall under the penumbra of judicial review. In fact, the majority
opinion did not discuss judicial review under Article 81 even once.124 Some
justices indicated that treaties, being indistinguishable in effect from laws
insofar as domestic application is concerned, would fall under the term
as utilized in Article 81.125 Justice Kotani, on the other hand, would
have recognized a power of judicial review commensurate with that
exercised by federal courts in the United States, after which the Japanese
126
Because the majority opinion and all of the
121
122

Id. at 3235.
Id.

123

the power to conduct substantive investigation for the sake of formality . . . to determine whether or not it
Id. at 3258 (Tarumi, J., concurring).
ordi
Id. at 3256.
Article 81 is first mentioned in the concurring opinion of Justices Fujita and Irie. Id. at 3246
(Fujita & Irie, JJ., concurring).
124
125

for judicial review of all la
Id. at 3280 (Okuno & Takahashi, JJ.,
concurring); Justice Shima expressed even less aversion to judicial review, noting that the Court need only
improper compared with the
Id. at 3245 (Shima, J., concurring).
126

provision which directly confers the power of judicial review but that such a power intrinsically exists in
the court which is bound by the Constitution and the laws. According to this, Article 81 is reduced to a
provision which merely stipulates that the Supreme Court is the court of last resort with regard to reviewing
Id. at 3273 (Kotani, J., concurring); Justice Kotani adopted this broad
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concurring opinions were unanimous in that even the most politically
sensitive treaties are reviewable under certain circumstances, the Sunakawa
case at the very least does not preclude the contention that a constitutional
amendment, applicable domestically and not involving sensitive negotiations
with a foreign sovereign, would also be judicially reviewable.
Nevertheless, some attempt should be made to harmonize the
Sunakawa
holding on the appropriate level of deference due to
treaties on the one hand and the text of the Constitution on the other, to
apparent
differential in scope between Articles 81 and 98. While Article 81 vests the
ower to determine the constitutionality of any
law, order, regulation or official act 127 the question remains of who can
imperial rescript or other act of government that
is nevertheless unconstitutional under Article 98. 128 The short answer, as
he whole judicial power is vested in
a Supreme Court 129
he Supreme Court is the court of last resort. 130
the concept of superiority of the
131
judiciary
Justices Okuno and Takahashi
briefly attempted to address this apparent discrepancy, concluding only that
t
included in paragraph 1, Article 98, it does not come under the Constitution
132
Indeed, under the
general canon of construction that individual provisions should be
interpreted in harmony with one another, 133 Articles 81 and 98 are best

Id. at 3277.
127

K
art. 81 (emphasis added).
128
Both
arts. 81, 98.
129
Id. art. 76, para. 1; cf. id. para. 2
130

Japanese term meirei. See id.

Id. art. 81.
Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3246 (Fujita & Irie, JJ., concurring).
132
Id. at 3281 (Okuno & Takahashi, JJ., concurring).
133
See LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT READS
THE CONSTITUTION 36 (2009). Contemporaneous statements from the GHQ drafters confirm that the 1946
Constitution was intended to be viewed as a whole. See Hideo Tanaka, A History of the Constitution of
Japan of 1946, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 42
Constitution as written is basic. . .
131
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understood as providing non-exhaustive lists to illustrate the broad reach of
the Court s power of judicial review.134
Delving further into the constitutional text, however, reveals that the
slight differences between the two lists indicate separate conceptions of the
breadth of judicial review. Applying the common maxims of noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis,135 Article 81 appears to provide a list of those
presumptively reviewable acts of government in order of diminishing
formality
. 136 Article 98, in contrast, lists items
differing in kind
under
Chapter IV of the Constitution;
an action by the
executive branch under Chapter V; imperial
obviously emanating
from the Emperor, although that power no longer exists in Chapter I of the
1946 Constitution; while the gener
would
arguably extend to any action performed by any other manifestation of
governmental authority under the remaining Chapters of the Constitution.137
This would undoubtedly include local ordinances, or
, issued by local
138
Read in

134

This understanding is supported by the GHQ

Birth of the Constitution of Japan: GHQ Original Draft: Ellerman Notes on Minutes of Government
Section, Public Administration Division Meetings and Steering Committee Meetings Between 5 February
and 12 February Inclusive, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/
147shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
135
See Noscitur a sociis, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
word or phrase
; Ejusdem generis,
BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
of specifics, the
Similar
principles for ascertaining meaning from surrounding terms apply in Japanese interpretation. See Hirano
Toshihiko, Sono ta heiretsu sono ta no reiji
[
Et Cetera
An Exegesis of Legal Terminology Part 1], 9 HIROSHIMA L. REV. 87 (2013),
https://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/files/public/3/34433/2014101620204869106/HiroshimaLawRev_9_87.pdf.
136
K
art. 81.
id. arts. 56, 59;
agreement among the Cabinet, id. art.
, or kisoku, potentially referring to procedural rules
that can be established by courts or the Diet to govern their own actions, id. arts. 58, 77; and any other
see id.
[for] damage through illegal act of any public official
Sup. Ct. July 7, 1948,
K
801, 808
137
K
art. 98; cf.
M
385, 391,
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/161/052161_hanrei.pdf [hereinafter Ishizuka] (interpreting the
residual clause as reaching any exercise of public authority with similar characteristics to the listed items,
)). For background
on the Ishizuka case, see SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 242 43.
138
K
art. 94; see also Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3272
the Constitution there is not a thread of doubt that such
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conjunction, all governmental actions, regardless of formality or source of
power, are therefore subject to judicial review, and there is no reason why
this rationale would not also extend to Chapter IX Amendments.
At first glance, such an interpretation of the wide breadth of judicial
review would seem to contradict the Sunakawa principle that some treaties
are beyond the Court s reach. Despite appearances, these results are not
actually in conflict, and the Sunakawa Court s holding can be reconciled
with the text of the Constitution. Article 98 s residual clause extends to any
), 139 which is undoubtedly a
broad term under which nearly any conceivable governmental action might
fall. Most notably, Article 7 supports this broad reading in delineating those
) to be performed by the Emperor,
140
which includes
The near identical terminology used in the Japanese text is illuminating in
this respect kokumu ro
state affairs 141 and kokuji as
142
However, other provisions of the Constitution shed
light on the intended distinction between these terms.143 In particular, Article
72 uses kokumu
relations, or
.144 The term kokuji only used in the Constitution to
145
can be understood as supplying the

id. at 3280 81 (Okuno & Takahashi, JJ., concurring) (comparing
reviewability of local ordinances to treaties).
139
K
art. 98. This Japanese translation of what would become Article 98 was changed during the
One key distinction on which the
Supreme Court has spoken is that the act in question must be governmental in nature, so when the
government is acting as an individual such as by purchasing land to build a Self-Defense Force base it
does not fall within the reach of Article 98. Ishizuka, supra note 137, at 391.
140
K
art. 7.
141

K
142

See Kokumu, KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/jeword/
id.

(last visited Nov. 24, 2018); see also

Kokuji, KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/jeword/
(last visited Nov. 24, 2018).
Under the widely accepted canon of construction, words used in a constitution are presumed to
have the same meaning throughout. BLOOM, supra note 133, at 31. Correspondingly, where a different term
is used, it is reasonable to believe a different meaning is intended. See id. at 451 n.6. How a term is used
elsewhere within the text can further aide in determining its proper meaning. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999).
144
K
art. 72 (emphasis added) The Prime Minister . . . reports on general national affairs and
foreign relations to the Diet . . . .
145
Id. arts. 3, 4, 5, 7.
143
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146

Affairs of state (kokumu) and foreign relations
(
), therefore, each comprise a subset of the overall panoply of potential
governmental activities.
Because Article 98 utilizes the term kokumu in extending
), this can be interpreted as only
precluding judicial review for those decisions involving foreign affairs
(
)
representatives,147
l under the Sunakawa
standard. On the other hand, judicial review would be presumptively
available for all other domestic acts. 148 Such a reading would provide a
textual hook within the Constitution to support the Sunakawa decision149 and
-established political question doctrine.150 The Constitution
of Japan being a document of domestic application, amendments should then
be co
subservient to the Constitution under
Article 98, and in turn, subject to judicial review under Article 81.
This is not to imply that Article 98 confers a separate power of
judicial review on the Supreme Court beyond that contained in Article 81 or
that a constitutional amendment by itself could be challenged in court.
Instead, Article 98 adds dimensional perspective to the reach of judicial
review authorized under Article 81. Another constitutional limit not yet
146
147

Id. art. 7.

vested in the Cabinet. K

art. 72, para. 1, cl. 2. This coincides with the general understanding of the
See United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
148
Some sch
2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL.,
CH SHAKU NIHONKOKU KENP [THE ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN] 1485 (1984
I]ssai no
...
), in turn, includes constitutions, and would equally
extend to amendments. See
, KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/word/
-499793 (last visited May
25, 2018). Of course, because the Constitution of Japan has never actually been amended, much of the
work in this area is purely theoretical. In the absence of definitive interpretations from the Supreme Court,
the best course is to rely on the constitutional text.
149

that particular s

-changing
Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3248
49 (Fujita & Irie, JJ., concurring). This, along with the other concurrences, suggests that whether foreign
policy is involved, as opposed to purely domestic policy, may be the determining factor on the question of
reviewability.
150
See, e.g., Tomabechi v. Japan, Sup. Ct. June 8, 1960, Sh 30 (o) no.96, 14 MINSH 1206, 1210,
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=14 (declining to review the highly political decision to
dissolve the House of Representatives); Chen & Wada, supra note 30, at 352 & n.22; Shigenori Matsui,
supra note 30, at 1387 88 (discussing the political question doctrine).
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discussed is that any attempt to challenge an amendment would still need to
151
comply with
For example, a
justiciable case could potentially exist when an official acts or refuses to act
under a law passed pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional amendment.152
Even though the preceding analysis clarifies that no constitutional barriers
prevent courts from reviewing a challenged amendment, the Court may still
fashion prudential limits to review. 153 As Albert and many other
commentators have recognized, 154 Japanese courts are considered to be
generally conservative and unlikely to interfere in areas of policy that are
better left to the discretion of the elected branches, such as economic
policies, social rights, and election laws. 155 A question that cannot be
answered is whether the Court will nevertheless fashion a similar prudential
barrier to review for the content of a constitutional amendment. While there
is at least some textual support in the Constitution counseling against
premature judicial review for the contents of treaties, as well as for laws
pertaining to elections and social welfare programs,156 similar language is
not present regarding amendments. Although Article 96 does proclaim that
all amendments
the means of public referendum, this merely speaks to amendment procedure,
151

nevertheless held that such a requirement was a precursor to the exercise of judicial power under Article 76,
which in turn is a precursor to judicial review for the constitutionality of a statute under Article 81. See
Shigenori Matsui, supra note 30, at 1379 (discussing the standing doctrine in the National Police Reserve
case).
152
The Sunakawa case is also instructive because the Court only considered the availability of
judicial review for a treaty when it was necessary to determine the validity of a criminal statute enacted to
enforce provisions of the underlying treaty. See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 42, at 709.
153
Other constitutional limits that the Supreme Court of Japan has recognized include immunities
from suit under treaties and international law, as well as cases that the Constitution itself places outside the
realm of judicial review, such as impeachment. See K
arts. 55, 64; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, K
[THE
CONSTITUTION] 331 (5th ed. 2011). An example in U.S. law of a mixed constitutional-and-prudential
doctrine would be mootness, which is not wholly mandated under the U.S. Constitution. See CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS22599, MOOTNESS: AN EXPLANATION OF THE JUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINE 3 5 (2007).
154
See Albert, supra note 2, at 671; Haley, supra note 30, at 1467; Shigenori Matsui, supra note 30,
at 1375.
155
See ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 332. Using election law as an example, although
judicial review may be precluded on discretionary determinations of where to draw borders for voting
districts, such policies have been declared unconstitutional when violating basic concepts such as equality
under the law. See K
Somers Bailey,
,
6 PAC. RIM L. & POL Y J. 169, 175 (1997).
156
See K
art. 73, para. 1, cl. 2 3
for
id.
atters pertaining to the method of
); id.
endeavors for the promotion and extension o

January 2019

Implicit Limits on Amending the Japanese Constitution

269

not content.157 To reiterate, nothing in the Constitution bars judicial review
of amendments, assuming a valid case or controversy is brought before the
Court. Whether or not the Court will actually exercise its power is a separate
question that is beyond the scope of this Comment.
D.

Scholarly Opinions and Foreign Judicial Decisions on Implicit
Limits to the Amendment Process
1.

Lessons from
Can Be
Applied to the Japanese Constitution, Even If the
Doctrine Itself Cannot

Although the Constitution of Japan benefits from a specific textual
provision
ability to invalidate an otherwise
properly promulgated act of the legislative branch, not every constitution
clearly recognizes the power of judicial review. 158 Nevertheless, various
courts across the globe have at times taken it upon themselves to exercise
powers not explicitly granted under their respective constitutions to prevent
the abuses of governmental actors, even to the point of invalidating
constitutional amendments.159 T
doctrine is possibly the earliest and most well known instance of this
notion.160
the constitution that provides for an amendment process, the ability to
amend the constitution must be limited to those actions that would not
destroy its
. 161 In fact, this understanding is nearly identical

157
Thus far, this Comment has been concerned with the reviewability of a constitutional challenge to
the content of an amendment procedural challenges are presumptively justiciable. Cf. U.S. v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716 (1931) (exercising jurisdiction over procedural and substantive challenges to the validity of
the Eighteenth Amendment). See infra Section II.D.2
views on the availability of judicial review for constitutional amendments. The Sunakawa Court also

that it comported with the process in Article 73. Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3236.
158
For example, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for the power of judicial review,
and yet Chief Justice Marshall found such a power implied in the grants of judicial power and original
jurisdiction under Article III. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173 74 (1803). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§
1 2, with K
art. 81 (explicitly providing for judicial review).
159
See, e.g., Po Jen Yap, Constitutional Fig Leaves in Asia, 25 WASH. INT L L.J. 421, 444 45 (2016)
160
Albert, supra note 2, at 669 71. Although Albert ultimately dismisses the possibility that Japanese
courts will follow a similar route. Id. at 671.
161
See id.
Judicial
Supremacy in Comparative Constitutional Law, 92 TUL. L. REV. 393, 414 28 (2017).
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to the views ascribed to by many Japanese constitutional scholars,162 and as
such, may be useful in determining how the Supreme Court of Japan could
approach a similar controversy.
Unlike the broad language in Articles 81 and 98 of the Japanese
Constitution, Article 13 of the Indian Constitution
in such a manner so as to arguably preclude review of amendments. 163
Nevertheless, the Indian Supreme Court reasoned that allowing the Indian
distort [the
constitution] out of recognition . . . [by] demolish[ing] the very pillars on
which the preamble rests 164
doctrine to strike down an amendment that would have removed any implicit
he donee
of a limited power cannot by the exercise of that power convert the limited
165
power into an unlimited
Although the particulars of the amendment
process under the Indian Constitution are immediately distinguishable from
the situation in Japan,166 the approach taken by the Indian Supreme Court in
identifying the contours of limits to the amendment power is instructive.
In particular, when first announcing the doctrine in Kesavananda
Bharati v. State of Kerala
structural approach to interpretation, considering not only the
the preamble, the directive principles, and
167
the non-inclusion in Article: 368
Based on these sources, the Court concluded that the
162
See, e.g., ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 385 88 (describing the three pillars of the
Constitution of Japan popular sovereignty, individual rights, and pacifism with particular note of the
Preamble as placing those pillars outside of Article 96); John M. Maki, The Constitution of Japan: Pacifism,
Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental Human Rights, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (1990); see also
discussion infra Section II.D.3. Nevertheless, those views falter under the same criticisms
supra note 2, at 670 (discussing criticisms of the
163

See INDIA CONST. art. 13, §
law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent
(emphasis added); id. §
this article
ordinance,
order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage . . . .
164
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCR 206, 240 (India).
165
Id.
166
For example, Article 368 of the Indian Constitution does not require every amendment to be
submitted to popular referendum. INDIA CONST. art. 368, § 2. Furthermore, amendments to certain Articles
and Chapters of the Constitution were specifically entrenched and further required the approval of a
majority of the state legislatures. Thus, the Indian Supreme Court was justified in concluding that
See Kesavananda Bharati v.
State of Kerala, (1973) 4 S.C.C. 225, 393 (India); Mate, supra note 161, at 418.
167
Mate, supra note 161, at 418.
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Indian Constitution rested on five unamendable pillars. 168 Although the
Kesavananda
,
which accounts for a majority of those five pillars,169 its structural analysis
allowed the Court to look beyond the plain text of Article 368 to ascertain
how various provisions interact with one another. As the doctrine evolved, a
framework emerged for identifying whether a feature was part of the
purpose, its
placement within the overall constitutional scheme, and
170

Courts in other countries have also adopted judicial review of
constitutional amendments similar to the
but only under similar circumstances. In Taiwan, for example, there are no
appreciable checks and balances on the National Assembly ability to
amend the Constitution. 171 Owing to this peculiar imbalance, the Judicial
Yuan
the constitutional
amendment proceedings must especially abide by the due process to ensure
that the will of the public is indeed fully taken into consideration. 172 Based
on that reasoning, the Judicial Yuan invalidated a constitutional amendment
that was enacted by anonymous vote as violating constitutional principles of
transparency.173 Courts in Brazil, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, South
Africa, and Turkey have also adopted a similar
ctrine of
some sort in response to too-lenient amendment barriers.174 However, not
every court considering the doctrine has accepted its premise.175
168
Those five principles are the constitutional supremacy, republican form of government, secularism,
separation of powers, and federalist principles. Id. (quoting Kesavananda, 4 SCC at 274).
169
See INDIA CONST.
India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC . . .
170
Mate, supra note 161, at 421 (quoting Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, (1975) Supp. SCC
1, 252 (India)).
171
See MINGUO XIANFA [CONSTITUTION], arts. 72, 127 (1947) (Taiwan).
172
Judicial Yuan [J.Y.] Interpretation No. 499, DAFAGUAN J IESHI [JIESHI] (Const. Ct. Mar. 24, 2000)
(Taiwan), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=499.
173
See id.; Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YALE J. INT L L. 1, 17
(2018).
174
See generally Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 5, 21 31
(2009) (discussing India, South Africa, and Germany); Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional
Amendments: The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 657, 677 713
(2013) (discussing Brazil, Italy, Turkey, and many other Latin American, European, and Asian countries);
Vincent J. Samar, Can a Constitutional Amendment Be Unconstitutional?, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 667,
727 35 (2008) (discussing Germany, India, Argentina, and Nepal).
175
See Yvonne Tew, On the Uneven Journey to Constitutional Redemption: The Malaysian Judiciary
and Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH. INT L L. J.

272

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 28 NO. 1

T
also appears to contradict the
applicability of such a doctrine. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment is
commonly viewed as having
achieve the goals of Reconstruction. 176 Because Article V of the U.S.
Constitution subjects all varieties of amendment to the same rigorous
process, 177 the legitimacy of even such a fundamental revision is hardly
questionable.178 Likewise,
founding document, such a
doctrine would seem inapposite to the Constitution of Japan.179 Nevertheless,
one obvious parallel
Japanese scholarship on the limits of Article 96 is their reliance on the text
of the Preamble. 180 More important, however, is the fact that the Indian
Supreme Court has routinely employed a broader structural analysis to
uncover implicit limits on the amendment power. At the very least, such an
approach may prove useful for illuminating limits on the scope of Article 96.
This analytical framework will be explored further in Parts III and IV.

doctrine in Malaysian courts); Roznai, supra note 174, at 699 701 (discussing rejection of the doctrine in
Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka).
176
See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 57 (1976); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 288 94 (1998); cf. Albert, supra note 105
177
Although it could be said that Article 96 of the Japanese Constitution employs the same approach
of subjecting all amendments
to the same adoption and ratification
process, the historical circumstances surrounding the Civil War and Reconstruction largely mirror the
revolutionary circumstances that made such drastic changes permissible in Japan at the time of the adoption
of the Meiji and 1946 Constitutions. See discussion supra Section II.B.
178
Although that has not prevented hardliner segregationists from attacking aspects of the adoption
process to discredit the Fou
See, e.g., Forrest McDonald, Was the
Fourteenth Amendment Constitutionally Adopted?, 1 GA. J.S. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1991).
179
Far from being rife for abuse, many Japanese politician and even some scholars have decried
the constitutional amendment process in Article 96 as a near impossible hurdle. See, e.g., Stephen Harner,
Why Abe Is Right About Constitutional Revision, FORBES (Dec. 23, 2013, 9:30 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2013/12/23/why-abe-is-right-about-constitutional-revision/;
Why Should the Current Japanese Constitution Be Amended?, JAPAN INST. FOR NAT L FUNDAMENTALS
(Nov. 30, 2012), https://en.jinf.jp/news/archives/1623.
180
Despite this superficial similarity, fundamental differences in the drafting history and context
surrounding the adoption of the Indian Constitution and the Constitution of Japan would counsel against
employing the same reasoning. In justifying its reliance on the Preamble, the Kesavananda Court noted that

diverse peoples . . . [The Indian Constitution] has a noble and grand vision. The vision was put in words in
the Preamble and carried out in part by conferring fundamental rights on the people. The vision was
v. State
of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225, 306 (India).
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Unwritten Unamendability Doctrine in the United States
as a Jumping-Off Point

Because Japan is a civil law country, the learned views of
constitutional scholars are often treated as a source of law unto themselves
and can be highly influential. 181 As such, scholarly opinions on implicit
unamendability in both the United States and Japan can provide some insight
into what facets of constitutional text and structure may be instructive when
interpreting Article 96. In regards to the U.S. Constitution, the common
understanding is that every provision is amendable. Douglas Linder
summarized this notion as follows: Nothing could be more inconsistent
with the conception of the living Constitution than an unamendable
amendment or an amendment authorizing unamendable amendments and
which by its own terms is unamendable. 182 While it may seem at odds with
a constitution designed for the purpose of protecting individual liberties, this
concept is deeply rooted in the history of the U.S. Constitution. 183
Entrenchment provisions were thought to endanger the long-term viability of
any constitution,
increases the risk of violence and
revolutionary change, and it increases the risk that people will grow to
disrespect the source of the institutions and arrangements that are forced on
them. 184 There are, nevertheless, some provisions in the U.S. Constitution
that were explicitly entrenched against amendment. The only clause that
specifically recognized such statuses was located within Article V itself.185
As part of a compromise to secure ratification in the Southern states, Article
V prohibited amending the Constitution to abolish the slave trade or impose
any direct taxation on states prior to 1808.186 The equal representation of
states in the Senate
no state, without its
consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate 187 The Equal
Suffrage Clause may therefore be constructively unamendable, as no state
would rationally consent to a reduction of its own representation.188 Aside
from these provisions in Article V, U.S. scholars have also indicated that
181

See THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 24, at 59 60.
Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 731 (1981).
183
See AMAR, supra note 32, at 285 86 (describing problems with the Articles of Confederation that
convinced the founders of the need for flexibility).
184
Linder, supra note 182, at 731.
185
See U.S. CONST. art. V, § 2. These temporal entrenchments have long since expired, so nothing is
explicitly unamendable at present. See Albert, supra note 173, at 22 & n.97.
186
See U.S. CONST. art. V, § 2; Linder, supra note 182, at 721; AMAR, supra note 32, at 20 21.
187
U.S. CONST. art. V, § 3.
188
See Albert, supra note 2, at 662; Linder, supra note 182, at 717 n.3.
182
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various fundamental concepts, such as certain democratic participation rights
protected by the First Amendment,189 may be so
identity as to have acquired unamendable status.190 Some have additionally
argued that the Equal Protection Clause, perhaps due to its widespread
popular support in the political realm as well as in private civil litigation and
popular culture, may be considered unamendable.191 And yet scholars and
politicians alike have seriously advocated for the repeal or curtailment of
various provisions in both the First and Fourteenth amendments.192
Although the implicit limits to the amendment power of Article V are
far from settled, arguably any such limits must have at least some root in the
actual text of the Constitution and not just popular support. One interesting
claim of unamendability has focused on the specific language used as
he No Religious Test Clause of Article VI
no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States 193 One scholar has argued
his is the only instance of the
in the
Constitution, and it is the only time any word indicating permanence appears
in the Constitution
e No Religious Test Clause is therefore implicitly
entrenched against amendment.194 This claim, while certainly novel, is not
entirely indefensible insofar as it finds support both within the text and in the

189

See Albert, supra note 105, at 40.
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 33 34 (2008) (suggesting that a
republican form of government and the rule of law may be unamendable concepts); AMAR, supra note 32,
at 292 (suggesting that the amendment power itself cannot be eliminated). See generally Yaniv Roznai,
Towards a Theory of Unamendability (N.Y.U. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 515,
2015), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1515&context=nyu_plltwp (surveying various
theories of unamendability with a focus on primary and secondary constituent power).
191
See JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS
110 (6th ed. 2015).
192
This includes the current U.S. President. See Phillip Bump, Donald Trump and Scott Walker Want
, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/08/18/donald-trump-and-scott-walker-want-torepeal-birthright-citizenship-its-nearly-impossible/; Josh Marshall, Priebus: Trump Considering Amending
or Abolishing 1st Amendment, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Apr. 30, 2017, 3:41 PM)
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/priebus-trump-considering-amending-or-abolishing-1st-amendment.
Of course, calls for amending the First Amendment have come from both sides of the aisle. See, e.g., David
Cole, How to Reverse Citizens United: What Campaign-Finance Reformers Can Learn from the NRA,
ATLANTIC, Apr. 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/how-to-reverse-citizensunited/471504/.
193
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (emphasis added).
194
George Mader, Binding Authority: Unamendability in the United States Constitution A Textual
and Historical Analysis, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 841, 843 (2016).
190
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. 195 That same scholar also reasoned that,
since the U.S. Constitution itself contains at least one explicit entrenchment
provision and quite possibly two other implicit ones unamendable
provisions are not entirely contrary to the spirit of a living constitution.196
Even assuming that inclusio
implicitly entrench the No Religious Test Clause, the question remains of
whether such an entrenchment itself would also be considered unamendable.
Despite being invoked to amend the U.S. Constitution twenty-seven
times, the Supreme Court has not yet specifically recognized any implicit
limits to Article V.197 Various procedural challenges to ratified amendments
have been deemed justiciable, 198 although it is unclear what a justiciable
substantive challenge would look like.
even provisions not subject to normal amendment
can still be changed, but only by utilizing additional processes or by
adopting an entirely new constitution. 199 Constitutional law scholar Akhil
Reed Amar suggests that even the explicit entrenchment provisions in
Article V could themselves have been amended out, thereby allowing a
second amendment to ban slavery prior to 1808.200
process that would be required to overcome
implicit entrenchment provisions as well. Because Article V does not limit
its own scope, it also does not proscribe the future enactment of provisions
explicitly entrenched
. 201 Therefore, if
202
such a doubly entrenched amendment is enacted, future generations must
still be able to remove those explicitly unamendable provisions under the
proper circumstances. 203 When that time comes, it is undoubtedly the
195

See id. at 870 78. But cf. AMAR, supra note 32

.
See George Mader, Generation Gaps and Ties That Bind: Constitutional Commitments and the
, 60 HOW. L.J. 483, 515 17 (2017).
197
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DOC. NO. 112 9, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:
ANALYSIS
INTERPRETATION
997 98
(interim
ed.
2017),
AND
https://www.congress.gove/content/conan/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2017.pdf.
198
See id. at 911 13; U.S. v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
199
See Albert, supra note 105, at 22 23 (discussing Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4
SCC 225, 366); cf. AMAR, supra note 32, at 295 99 (questioning whether Article V is the exclusive vehicle
to amend the Constitution, as the text of Article V conspicuously lacks such a descriptor).
200
AMAR, supra note 32, at 292 93.
201
See Mader, supra note 196, at 495.
202
Cf. Roznai, supra note 190, at 4 (discussing the proliferation of unamendable provisions in more
than half of modern constitutions).
203
Cf. Linder, supra note 182, at 733 (suggesting that Article V itself also cannot be amended to limit
the scope of future amendments). An explicit entrenchment provision could thereby narrowly be read as
196

276

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 28 NO. 1

Supreme Court that must then determine whether those circumstances have
been met,204 logically implying at least some degree of substantive review
for constitutional amendments. Given the potential availability of judicial
review at least to determine the amendability of explicitly entrenched
provisions, there is no reason why the Supreme Court could not also
theoretically invalidate an amendment that had failed to first repeal an
explicit or implicit entrenchment.
3.

The Current Prevailing Views in Japan on Implicit Limits
to Article 96

Any discussion of the limits to constitutional amendments must begin
with the first and only successful amendment in Japanese history the 1946
Constitution itself. Given the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the 1946 Constitution,205 however, there is no consensus among
Japanese scholars on what implicit limits to Article 96 exist.206 This debate
has resulted in two general camps of thought on the amendment power:
207
Notably, the
the position that U.S. constitutional scholars generally adhere to.208 So long
as a proposed constitutional amendment satisfies the literal commands of
Article 96
content then there are no limits to what can or cannot be amended.209 As
such, the 1946 Constitution would have been a permissible amendment of
the Meiji Constitution. The converse assertion is that, if two-thirds of both
Houses and half of the Japanese voters so desired, sovereignty could just as
easily be returned to the Emperor, thus reinstating the Meiji Constitution.210
Going one step further, hardliner conservative theorists routinely decry the
only precluding amendment under the procedures in Article V, while still allowing for the adoption of some
other amendment creating a new amendment process to circumvent those limits.
204
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 197, at 1011 14 (discussing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S.
433 (1939), and the availability of judicial review under Article V.
205
For a more in-depth history of the drafting of the 1946 Constitution, see generally Goodman,
supra note 2, at 23 25; KOSEKI S
, supra note 36; MCNELLY, supra note 114.
206
See Tsuji Yuichiro, Amendment of the Japanese Constitution A Comparative Law Approach, 37
NANZAN REV. AM. STUDS. 51, 65 (2015). Coincidentally, the Japanese government largely consisting of
career bureaucrats has not weighed in on which understanding of amendment limits (or lack thereof) it
officially adopts. See id. at 63 (citing SAKATA MASAHIRO, S
KU [GOVERNMENTAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] 308 (2013)).
207
Id. at 64; see also ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 385 386; 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL.,
supra note 148, at 1440 50.
208
See, e.g., Albert, supra note 2, at 667.
209
See Tsuji Yuichiro, supra note 206, at 64; 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1446 49.
210
See Tsuji Yuichiro, supra note 206, at 64 65 (describing so-called constitutional suicide).
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therefore lacks any real legitimacy.211 This view, while generally rejected by
constitutional scholars, appears to have its greatest foothold in the nationalist
movement.212 Unfortunately, many of those who lead the party that holds the
reins on future constitutional reform also subscribe to such beliefs.213
In contrast, u
provides the mechanisms for proposing and adopting amendments, Article
96 cannot therefore be used to usher in fundamental changes that would
destroy the Co
214
Although there is disagreement on the extent,
the majority of Japanese scholars generally accept the proposition that the
ability to amend the Constitution is limited.215 Many arguments focus on the
theoretical aspects of popular sovereignty, assuming such limits naturally
exist as the power to enact a constitution resides solely with the people, and
the people would never allow for an amendment that would threaten their
own sovereignty, such as reestablishing a monarchy. 216 In contrast, under an
Imperial monarchy, the Emperor could unilaterally
in its entirety without threatening
least.217 It is this distinction between Article 96 conferring only the power to
the existence of such limits.218 Having established that Article 96 grants only
ish a constitution, many
211
See Boyd, supra note 57, at 48 50; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24 at 262. For a published
example of these arguments, see generally KOYAMA TSUNEMI, NIHONKOKU K
(2002).
212
See Boyd, supra note 57, at 49 50.
213
See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33436, JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8 (2016)

some cases ultraGelernter, Japan Reverts to Fascism, NAT L
https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/07/japans-new214

REV.

(July

16,

2016,

8:00

AM),

Tsuji Yuichiro, supra note 206, at 65.
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24 at 260. For an early discussion on limits to Article 96, see
Inomata K
et al.,
[Symposium: Should the Constitution be
Amended or Not?], 68 C
(1953), reprinted in K
[CONSTITUTIONAL
K
AMENDMENT THEORY] 170 (Hasegawa Masayasu & Mori Hideki eds., 1977).
216
See 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1443 44; S
TATSUO, supra note 24, at 571.
In many respects, this understanding, mirrors and predates
doctrine. See Tokujin Matsudaira, Japan s Election and Constitutional Revision, INT L J. CONST. L. BLOG
(Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2012/12/japans-election-and-constitutional-revision/.
217
See 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1440 41.
218
See id. at 1443
monarchies were overthrown).
215
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scholars have settled on at least three fundamental pillars that cannot be
amended through the exercise of that limited power.219 Some contend that
the popular referendum requirement in Article 96 is also unamendable, as
abolishing it would greatly upset the balance of popular sovereignty. 220
One major dilemma is how to harmonize this limited theory with the
reality that the 1946 Constitution itself arguably far exceeded the limits of
In an attempt to alleviate this
tension, the August Revolution theory (hachigatsu kakumei setsu) posits that
. 221 Under this
theory, it was in actuality the Potsdam Declaration which laid out the
222
terms for
that reverted sovereignty in
Japan to the people, whereby the processes in Article 73 were followed
merely to give the appearance of legitimacy. 223 The Emperor officially
accepted those terms of surrender on August 14, 1945,224 hence the name
concept of
Imperial sovereignty enshrined in the Meiji Constitution therefore posed no
bar to the passage of a wholesale revision.225 By diminishing the role of the
Meiji Constitution in the adoption process, this theory attempts to preserve
the assumption that amendments are implicitly limited to those that do not
destroy or rewrite the Constitution itself. Despite the August Revolution
226
common criticisms include the fact that
the Potsdam Declaration of its own terms did not demand the transfer of

219
See id. at 1444 45. Those pillars consist of popular sovereignty, individual rights, and pacifism.
See id.; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 386 87; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 260 61;
S
TATSUO, supra note 24, at 571 73.
220
See ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 387 88; S
TATSUO, supra note 24, at 573.
221
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 18 21; MILLER, supra note 9, at 274 77. See generally
MIYAZAWA TOSHIYOSHI KENP NO GENRI [PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION] 376 89 (1967) (explaining
222
See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Potsdam Declaration, NAT L DIET LIBR.,
http://ww.ndl.go.jp/consitution/e/etc/c06.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
223
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 124 29; cf. 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at
1441 43 (doubting any real legal continuity between the Meiji and 1946 Constitutions due to such inherent
limits to the amendment power).
224
See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Imperial Rescript of the Termination of the War, August 14,
1945, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/017shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4,
2018).
225
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 19; MILLER, supra note 9, at 354 n.67; MIYAZAWA
TOSHIYOSHI, supra note 221, at 387 89.
226
See Yamashita Takeshi, 8-gatsu kakumei setus to 4-gatsu seitei setsu
wa itsu ka [August Revolution Theory and April Establishment Theory When Is the
Birthday?], T
L. REV., Mar. 2008, at 1, 5.
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sovereignty from the Emperor to the people,227 as well as the fact that the
Meiji Constitution continued in force up until the new Constitution took
effect on May 3, 1947.228 The government at the time rejected this theory by
reiterating that legal continuity was maintained by complying with the Meiji
.229 Regardless of the precise mechanisms
230
involved, at the very least, it is safe to say that the 1946 Constitution has
since been accepted by the vast majority of the Japanese people as legitimate.
Even if Japanese scholars are generally in agreement that removing
certain fundamental pillars goes beyond the scope of Article 96,231 the lack
of explicit textual support in Article 96 may impede courts from reaching a
similar conclusion. Another critique scholars must contend with is that there
232
Despite such
criticisms, Japanese scholars have constructed text-based arguments for the
unamendability of the three fundamental
:
popular sovereignty, individual rights, and pacifism. 233 Although these
concepts can be traced back to the Potsdam Declaration 234 and instructions
from General MacArthur 235 and others within the Occupation,236 Japanese
scholars understandably prefer to rely on the Preamble.237
227
See id. at 6 7; cf. MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 216 n.2 (noting that a prior draft would have
explicitly allowed the preservation of the current constitutional monarchy).
228
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 4; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 16, 19. For an
overview of the various theories on when the Meiji Constitution ended, see Yamashita Takeshi, supra note
226, at 3 10.
229
See MILLER, supra note 9, at 354 nn.68 69; MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 28 29.
230
Some scholars also attempt to resolve this issue by noting that the new Constitution did not
become supreme law of Japan until Japanese sovereignty was officially returned on April 28, 1952. See
Yamashita Takeshi, supra note 226, at 29; Takehana Mitsunori,
[Procedure of Amendments to the Constitution of the Empire of Japan], 62 KOMAZAWA U. L. REV. 1, 29
(2001). In turn, Koseki refers to May 1949 as the true birth of the Constitution, when the Diet declined the
opportunity to pass further amendments and adopted the 1946 Constitution. KOSEKI S
, supra note 36,
at 4.
231
See Tsuji Yuichiro, supra note 206, at 66; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 18.
232
See 2 HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1445 46. Matsui identifies several other

autonomy, and Japanese society, although he stops short of claiming that such concepts are also
unamendable. SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 29 35.
233
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 260; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 385 88.
234
See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Potsdam Declaration, supra note 222. In particular, Article
Id.
Albert, supra note 2, at 674. The three basic points that General MacArthur identified as essential
to include in the new constitution were: retaining the Emperor as head of state, abolishing the sovereign
right to wage war, and ending the feudal system. See Birth of the Constitution of Japan: MacArthur Notes
235
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We, the Japanese people, . . . determined that we shall secure
for ourselves and our posterity . . . the blessings of liberty
throughout this land, . . . do proclaim that sovereign power
resides with the people and do firmly establish this
Constitution. . . . We . . . desire peace for all time and . . .
recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in
peace, free from fear and want.238
Although those three pillars can be found in the Preamble much like Indian
nowhere does the text explicitly
declare the corresponding provisions to be unamendable.239 Acknowledging
affirm the preexisting implicit limits on the amendment power.240
The unavoidable question that arises is what effect or legal force can
be attributed to rights or concepts recognized only in the Preamble? As far as
lthough that Preamble indicates the
general purposes for which the people ordained and established the
Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive
power 241 The Supreme Court of Japan reached a similar conclusion in
, NAT L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/
e/shiryo/03/072shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018).
236
The State-War7, 1946 policy directive in
See MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 4 7;
Birth of the Constitution of Japan: Reform of the Japanese Governmental System (SWNCC 228), NAT L
DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/059shoshi.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2018)
[hereinafter SWNCC 228].
237
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 261; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 387.
238
K
pmbl. (emphasis added).
239

Constitution did not contain an actual Preamble, although the Imperial Rescript on promulgation served
that role. MCNELLY, supra note 44
drafted by a single GHQ officer. Id. Although it was removed from the first Japanese draft, it was promptly
Id. at 83 84.
240
cle
89 of the French Constitution. See ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 387. However, this argument
overlooks the fact that those foreign constitutional provisions are substantive and explicitly entrench certain
concepts against amendment the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan shares neither quality. Compare
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 79, sec. 3, translation at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.deenglisch_gg/index.html (Ger.)
federalism] . . . or [
and 1958 CONST. art. 89, para. 5 (Fr.)
with K
pmbl.
derived from the people . . . this is a
.
241
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
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Ishizuka v. Japan
not a concrete right enforceable by courts. 242 The Nagoya High Court
revisited that same clause in 2008, albeit reaching a slightly different
conclusion.243 In dicta,244 the High Court declared that the Preamble, while
legal normative character
provides guidance on how to interpret other provisions in the Constitution.245
246
the High Court reasoned
that an unenumerated right to live in peace was cognizable under Article 13,
247

when viewed in conjunction with the renunciation of war in Article 9. 248
Although not providing tangible rights, the Preamble may yet prove useful
in guiding the interpretation of more concrete provisions in the Constitution.
Even assuming that the Preamble has independent force, the Preamble
of the 1946 Constitution contains very little support for the contention that
these three
mental
cannot be altered in any way. In particular,
claims for entrenchment of the pacifism principle in Article 9 have been
drawn from the Preamble
,249 but this simply masks the reality that
those arguments almost exclusively rely on popular support.250 Indeed, the
relevant text is lofty even for the Preamble, arguably extending well beyond
Japanese citizens. 251
question by subsequent attempts by the United States to urge Japanese
242
See
: The Nagoya High Court Recognizes the Right
to Live in Peace, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL Y J. 549, 550 n.9 (2010) (discussing Ishizuka, supra note 137, at
393).
243
Id. at 550.
244
The district court originally dismissed the case on standing, and the Nagoya High Court confirmed
that dismissal, then proceeded to discuss the underlying right in dicta. While not bound to that ruling, the
Okayama District Court followed the Nagoya High C
See id. at 550 51.
245
Id. at 560. In the Sunakawa case, Justice Tanaka, analyzing the merits of the security treaty, found
cooperation
Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3241 (Tanaka, J., concurring).
246
Cf.
ntees in the Bill of Rights).
247
K
art. 13.
248
Hamilton, supra note 242, at 560 61; see also Yuichiro Tsuji, Constitutional Law Court in Japan,
TSUKUBA H SEI [TSUKUBA J.L. & POL.], Mar. 2016, at 65, 71 72.
249
See ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 387.
250
See Albert, supra note 2, at 674 77; cf.
se Article 9 of Constitution
Produce Mixed Results, MAINICHI (May 22, 2017), https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170522/p2a/
00m/0na/009000c (explaining discrepancies in polls that show popular support for clarifying the
constitutional role of the Self-Defense Force, but not for amending Article 9).
251
See K
pmbl. (emphasis added)
all peoples of the world have the right to
.
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remilitarization.252 Without more concrete structural or textual support from
the operative text of the 1946 Constitution rather than the lofty prose of the
Preamble scholarly opinions may not be enough to convince courts to fully
. This is not to declare that no textual bases exist
within the 1946 Constitution that can support such claims of implicit
amendment limits. However, to achieve those results, a broader textual
onstitutional structure and history is necessary.
III.

THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL CONTEXT
LIMITS ON THE AMENDMENT PROCESS
A.

TO

UNDERSTANDING IMPLICIT

Explicit Limits to the Amendment Process Under the Meiji
Constitution Provide Context for Implicit Limits Under the
1946 Constitution

As noted above, Article 96 simply provides a procedural pathway for
any
Japan. It is the sole Article contained within Chapter IX of the Constitution,
253
From a cursory glance of the text, the
conclusion that the Constitution places no explicit or implicit limits on the
amendment power in Article 96 seems inescapable. While such a
straightforward answer is undoubtedly tempting, the Constitution of Japan
and its structure must be understood in its historical context. The Meiji
Constitution served as the model for the 1946 Constitution, which was then
adopted pursuant to the existing amendment process in Article 73 so as to
maintain legal continuity. As both documents share much of their structure
and mechanics, understanding the latter requires examining the former.
The 1946 Constitution consists of eleven chapters, 254 beginning with
symbol of the State,
252
See Lee Hudson Teslik, Japan and Its Military, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 13, 2006),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/japan-and-its-

estored in 1952, largely in response to the outbreak of the Korean War. See
MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 149 50.
253
See K
ch. IX.
254
The Chapters of the 1946 Constitution are arranged as follows: Chapter I, The Emperor (Articles
1 8); Chapter II, Renunciation of War (Article 9); Chapter III, Rights and Duties of the People (Articles
10 40); Chapter IV, The Diet (Articles 41 64); Chapter V, The Cabinet (Articles 65 75); Chapter VI,
Judiciary (Articles 76 82); Chapter VII, Finance (Articles 83 91); Chapter VIII, Local Self-Government
(Articles 92 95); Chapter IX, Amendments (Article 96); Chapter X, Supreme Law (Articles 97 99);
Chapter XI, Supplementary Provisions (Articles 100 103). See id. chs. I XI.
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recognizing the principle that all sovereign power is derived from the
people. 255 Although the Meiji Constitution contained only seven
chapters256 the first of which identified the Emperor as the sole source of
Japanese sovereignty 257 every chapter thereafter and their ordering to a
large extent remained intact through the constitutional transition after World
War II.258 Although the Constitution was rebuilt to reflect needed reforms as
identified by the GHQ, 259 the underlying structure was preserved, 260 and
many provisions were retained in their entirety.261 Certain institutions, such
as the bicameral legislature, were reinserted at the behest of Japanese
constitutional drafters,262 and several amendments from Japanese legislators
to the text of the final draft were incorporated prior to its promulgation.263
This understanding also reflects the reality that the 1946 Constitution was
not a foreign document wholly
.264

255

Id. art. 1.
The Chapters of the Meiji Constitution are arranged as follows: Chapter I, The Emperor (Articles
1 17); Chapter II, Rights and Duties of Subjects (Articles 18 32); Chapter III, The Imperial Diet (Articles
33 54); Chapter IV, The Ministers of State and the Privy Council (Articles 55 56); Chapter V, The
Judicature (Articles 57 61); Chapter VI, Finance (Articles 62 72); Chapter VII, Supplementary Rules
(Articles 73 76). See MEIJI K
chs. I VII.
257
Id. art. 1.
256

258

Constitution and was expanded from a
meager two Articles to eleven. Compare id. arts. 55 56, with K
arts. 65 75. This was due to the
absorption of many of the executive powers previously exercised by the Emperor, such as managing
foreign affairs and concluding treaties. Compare MEIJI K
art. 13, with K
art. 73.
259
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 79;
, NAT L
DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/002_15shoshi.html (last visited Nov. 25, 20180
[hereinafter Kades Letter].
260
See MCNELLY, supra note 44, at 58 (noting that one of the first things the GHQ drafters agreed on
was to preserve the structure and headings of the Meiji Constitution); KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at
91
new constitution for Japan but mere
the Hague Convention on Land Warfare, or for other practical reasons).
261
Compare MEIJI K
art. 33
and a House of R
with K
art. 42 (Japan)
262

See Hideo Tanaka, supra note 42, at 664.
Id.; see also KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 179 88 (discussing the adoption of Diet
amendments to Articles 23, 25, and 26, as well as the insertion of Article 10).
264
See, e.g., David S. Law, Three Popular Misconceptions About the Japanese Constitution,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/blog/david-law-three-popular-misconceptions-aboutjapanese-constitution (last updated May 9, 2017). Although due to increasing rhetoric from the LDP and
Prime Minister Abe, some western audiences have begun to accept that claim. See, e.g., Peter Landers,
, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 17, 2016, 9:45 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-gets-japans-attention-with-nuclear-remark-1471424823.
263
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As their structure and chapters are almost identical, some explanation
must be given to the significance of the differences therein. For example,
Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution is contained within its own chapter titled
265
Its location within the 1946 Constitution is not
266
happenstance. Chapter I of the Meiji Constitution contained seventeen
Articles, whereas Chapter I of the 1946 Constitution contains eight. This is
because
Articles in the Meiji Constitution that gave the Emperor power to issue
, 267 as well as
268
, and the sole ability to declare
269
war.
the Meiji Constitution have been repudiated and revoked.
That strategic placement of constitutional provisions specifically
seeking to rectify abuses of power under the Imperial government is also

270

Article 18 of the Meiji Constitution and Article 10 of the 1946 Constitution
are essentia
The conditions necessary for being a Japanese
national shall be determined by law 271 However, in contrast to the Meiji
Constitution, the Article immediately following the citizenship clause in the
fundamental human rights
guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the
people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights 272 and
the remainder of the chapter bears little similarity to the Articles describing
265

K

ch. II.

266

her tool commonly used in canon of constitutional interpretation. See BLOOM, supra
note 133, at 44
ontextual arguments in landmark cases,
including Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
267
MEIJI K
art. 9; see also id. art. 6 (providing an Imperial veto over laws passed by the Diet); id.
art. 8 (allowing for emergency ordinances); id.
SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 10 12 (detailing how these weak
checks on executive power led to Japanese militarization and World War II).
amendments would reinser
See LDP Draft, supra note 15, ch. IX (creating a
with the effect of law).
268
MEIJI K
arts. 11 12.
269
Id. art. 13.
270
K
ch. III; see also MEIJI K
271
K
art. 10; accord MEIJI K
Although the Japanese text does contain further differences in word usage and grammatical style. It is also
worth repeating that this Article was not included in the GHQ Draft. See GHQ Draft, supra note 43.
272
K
art. 11.
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rights in the Meiji Constitution. 273 Of course, this directly reflects the
desire to rectify the vast human rights curtailments and abuses
under the Imperial government,274 and, in many respects, was a necessary
component for any post-World War II constitution in Japan.275
The chapters on the Diet, the executive branch, the judiciary, and
finances follow the same ordering in both the Meiji Constitution and the
1946 Constitution, albeit with more specificity in duties and more checks
and balances in the 1946 Constitution. Many of the changes to these sections
reflect goals that the GHQ deemed necessary to the democratization of Japan,
such as combining an English-style parliamentary system with an Americanstyle executive branch,276 while others reflect proposals from the Japanese
Diet and Japanese drafters, who preferred to retain a bicameral legislature
277
One significant role of the
bicameral legislature is the ability of the House of Councillors to essentially
veto a bill passed by the House of Representatives, who can then override
that veto through a two-thirds majority vote.278
The remaining chapters of the 1946 Constitution consist of provisions
governing local governments, the amendment process, the supremacy of the
Supplementary Provisions 279 In contrast, the Meiji
Supplementary Rules 280 The
273
Compare, e.g., MEIJI K
art. 28 (emphasis added)
within limits not
prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious
with K
art. 20, para. 1
religious organization shall receive any privileges from the Sta
274
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 10 12; cf. Mindy Kotler, The Comfort Women and
on
Truth,
N.Y.
T IMES
(Nov.
14,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/opinion/comfort-women-and-japans-war-on-truth.html
(detailing

Even the Diet committee responsible for the Matsumoto Draft recognized the need to adopt measures to
prevent future rights violations. See KOSEKI S
, supra note 36, at 56.
275
See, e.g., SWNCC 228, supra note 236, app. B, para. 6; Kades Letter, supra note 259, cmt. 4.
276
See
Japan Relationship 64 65 (May 22, 2006) (unpublished graduate dissertation, University of Montana) (on
file
with
the
University
of
Montana,
at
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=3123&context=etd); see also K
art. 66 (creating a Prime Minister and a
civilian cabinet, all of whom are responsible to the Diet).
277
See Hideo Tanaka, supra note 42, at 664.
278
K
art. 59, para. 2. Although the gridlock caused by the two houses being controlled by
different political parties (nejire kokkai) has since resulted in some politicians to call for abolishing the
House of Councillors. See, e.g., ET SEISHIR , ICHIINSEI KOKKAI GA NIHON O SAISEISURU! [A UNICAMERAL
LEGISLATURE WILL REGROW JAPAN!] (2012).
279
K
chs. VIII XI.
280
MEIJI K
ch. VII.
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concept of local self-government was not contained in the Meiji Constitution,
although it was permitted by laws at the national level,281 and it was inserted
into the 1946 Constitution
conduct of local affairs. 282 The final chapter in the Meiji Constitution
dealing with miscellaneous provisions was then split up in order to
emphasize certain aspects, including important changes from the Meiji
Constitution. The relationship between Chapter VII of the Meiji Constitution
and Chapters IX and X of the 1946 Constitution, and what those similarities
mean is further explored in the sections that follow.
B.

The Context and Importance of the Final Chapter of the Meiji
Constitution

283

the first provision in this Chapter was the amendment process in
Article 73. Like many other provisions in the 1946 Constitution, the text of
Article 96 also closely mirrors that of its counterpart in the Meiji
Constitution, except that Article 73 imposed a two-thirds quorum
requirement whereas the 1946 Constitution shifts the power of amending the
Constitution to the public by requiring that any amendment be additionally
subject to popular referendum.284 In addition to the amendment process in
Article 73, Chapter VII contained three other provisions:
Article 74. No modification of the Imperial House Law shall be
required to be submitted to the deliberation of the Imperial Diet.
(2) No provision of the present Constitution can be modified by
the Imperial House Law.
Article 75. No modification can be introduced into the
Constitution, or into the Imperial House Law, during the time
of a Regency.
281
See KOSEKI S
, supra note 223, at 89 91; ASHIBE NOBOYOSHI, supra note 153, at 356; 2
HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1371 76.
282
Kades Letter, supra note 259, cmt. 5. Although the concept of local government was also
contained in one of the drafts proposed by Japanese scholars, see KOSEKI S
, supra note 223, at 89, it
was not publicly distributed at the time, HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1378, and the Chapter is
more readily attributable to policies in SWNCC-228, MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 77.
283
MEIJI K
ch. VII.
284
Compare K
art. 96, with MEIJI K
art. 73 (Japan). A similar sentiment can also be seen in
See CIA Draft, supra note 46.
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Article 76. Existing legal enactments . . . shall, so far as they do
not conflict with the present Constitution, continue in
force. . . .285
Although the amendment process was largely self-contained within
Article 73 much as it exists in Article 96 of the 1946 Constitution the
two Articles immediately following it both appear to impose some explicit
constraints on the amendment process.286 Article 76, on the other hand, deals
exclusively with wha
matter
it provides for what will happen to existing laws and contracts once the
Meiji Constitution comes into effect. This Article appears to correspond
ded in Chapter XI
at the end of the 1946 Constitution. It is also fairly obvious that Article 73 of
the Meiji Constitution is almost directly transplanted into Chapter IX
therefore, Chapter
spiritual successor to Articles 74 and 75 of the Meiji Constitution
that imposed explicit limitations on the amendment process.

Articles

This theory, while based primarily on the constitutional structure, is
further supported by the content of those two Articles and their combined
effect on the amendment process. By explicitly separating the processes for
modifying the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial House Law, Article 74
provided for something of a dual supremacy clause.287 The Diet, even when
acting pursuant to the amendment process in Article 73, was prohibited from
288
Likewise, the
Emperor, acting through the Imperial House Law, could not unilaterally
dismantle or undermine the Constitution. 289 Likewise, Article 75 further
285
MEIJI K
arts. 74 76 (emphasis added). Although translated as modification, the Japanese
term actually used in Paragraph 1 of Article 74 is kaisei, translated elsewhere as
. Id. art. 74,
para. 1. Other instances of modify use the term henk , or alter, see id. art. 9, arguably because they
refer to the process of changing the Imperial House Law, id. art. 74, para. 2, or both processes, id. art. 75.
286
See Takehana Mitsunori, supra note 230, at 20 23.
287

constitutional structure. Id. at 20.
288
Hirobumi , lead architect of the Meiji Constitution and first Prime Minister of Japan, reasoned
that the Imperial House Law bears no relation to the reciprocal rights and duties mentioned elsewhere in
the Meiji Constitution, and therefore any modifications need not be subjected to the Diet. HIROBUMI I ,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 155 56 (
Press 2d ed. 1978) (1906).
289
See id. at 156. (describing Paragraph 2
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solidifying the Imperial veto over
amendments.290 By prohibiting any amendment during a Regency, Article 75
ensured that the Diet could not conspire to take advantage of
ailment or age to undermine the Imperial structure.291 In addition to those
limitations, Article 73 itself required all proposed amendments to originate
from an Imperial Order,292 so the system was explicitly designed with the
control.293 Articles 73, 74, and 75, while primarily procedural in nature, were
designed to guarantee a substantive outcome protecting the Emperor as the
supreme source of law and legitimacy in Japan.
These provisions in conjunction erected a barrier around the Emperor
effectively entrenching the Imperial order itself against
dismantlement, unless the Emperor should somehow decide to do so
himself.294 Because both constitutions share nearly identical structures and
many similar provisions, it can rationally be understood that Chapter X of
the 1946 Constitution should function in the same manner as Articles 74 and
75 of the Meiji Constitution by implicitly entrenching substantive aspects
of the Constitution against dismemberment.295 Of course, because Article 73
was never invoked to amend the Meiji Constitution until the adoption of the
290

291

The Emperor already had the explicit power to veto any bill passed by the Diet. See MEIJI K
HIROBUMI I , supra note 288, at 12 (remarking that
).
HIROBUMI I

, supra note 288, at 157 (noting that this restriction was justified as the Imperial
and only the Emperor has the power of

amendment).
292
MEIJI K
293
See HIROBUMI I

, supra note 288, at 153 (confirming that the process in Article 73, which

).
Surely such a situation was unthought-of at the time, and yet that is exactly what transpired after
the Japanese surrender ending World War II. Cf. Takehana Mitsunori, supra note 230, at 9 (noting the
294

sovereignty was likewise unamendable). Once again, this serves to reiterate the point that all regimes
constitutional or otherwise ultimately must give way to revolution. Or, to assert the negative, barring a
revolution, adhering to the provided amendment scheme is the sole means of altering a constitution.
295
In a similar manner, one of the many textualist canons
[the legislature] borrows a statute, it adopts by implication interpretations placed on that statute, absent
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
324 (1994) (describing the borrowed statute rule). The 1946 Constitution by its own terms only rejects
See K
proposed interpretation of Chapter X albeit relying on the structure of the Meiji Constitution would not
reason to assume that such a structural comparison would be impermissible as an interpretive tool.
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1946 Constitution itself, there are no judicial decisions on this precise topic
either. As such, the only means of theorizing the potential limits of Article
73 and its relation to the 1946 Constitution is through a textual and structural
analysis, such as that employed above.
C.

Article 97

in Understanding the Function of Chapter X

Given the understanding that the provisions directly following the
ess in Article 73 were designed to
place both procedural and substantive limits on that process, and in light of
the previous discussion regarding the inherent structural and textual
similarities between the Meiji and 1946 Constitutions, the provisions
directly following Article 96 in the 1946 Constitution should likewise be
expected to place similar constraints on the amendment process. Although
Chapter X contains no express language acknowledging this functionality,
Article 97 strongly hints that its purpose in fact is to provide just such an
individual rights contained in Chapter III.
The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed
to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man
to be free; they have survived the many exacting tests for
durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in
trust, to be held for all time inviolate.296
Puzzlingly enough, no mention is made of the amendment process, nor of
supreme law or express limits on governmental powers, seemingly
foreclosing any possible relation to Articles 74 or 75 of the Meiji
Constitution. In fact, the language of Article 97 closely mirrors that in
Article 11
he people shall not be prevented from
enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human
rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon
the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights. 297
The similarity in the Japanese text is even more striking.298 This then begs
296

K
art. 97.
Id. art. 11 (emphasis added); see also id.
people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people . . .
298
Id. arts.
I]
no kenri . . . . .
297

290

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 28 NO. 1

several questions: Is Article 97 merely a tautology? If so, why did the
drafters decide to include two separate tautologies affirming the value of
fundamental human rights one in Chapter III and one in Chapter X? If not,
does Article 97 have any independent force separate from Article 11?299
While the text itself claims neither to prohibit nor mandate any form
of governmental action, the true purpose of Article 97 becomes clear only
from the context of its placement in the constitutional scheme. Under the
well-established rule against superfluity, language in a constitution must be
interpreted in such a manner as not to render it mere surplusage. 300 Chief
Justice Marshall endorsed just such a canon of construction in the seminal
case establishing the power of judicial review in the United States: Marbury
v. Madison. The Chief Justice reasoned that [i]t cannot be presumed that
any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect, and therefore
such construction is inadmissible unless the words require it 301 While it
certainly makes logical sense to assume that constitutional drafters would
not include superfluous provisions in a foundational text, that principle of
constitutional construction does not necessarily require courts to go out of
their way to transform every clause of constitutional text into an operative
one. 302 Certain introductory
clauses and preambles may
not themselves be intended to have an operative effect. 303 Nevertheless,
Chief Justice Marshall instructed that [i]f any other construction would
299
The question of drafting intent is particularly poignant here as the GHQ Draft did not contain this
second provision on individual rights. See GHQ Draft, supra note 43, ch. X. The provision was inserted
later by the Japanese drafters, supposedly in response to a request from the GHQ, although why it was
inserted in Chapter X remains unclear. See SAT TATSUO, supra note 66, at 116 17, 148 49. Despite early
criticisms that Article 97 was a misplaced duplication of Article 11, its placement in Chapter X has since
been suggested to indicate the unamendability of individual rights provisions. See HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL.,
supra note 148, at 1475, 1479.
300
See BLOOM, supra note 133, at 21; cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 643 (2008)

301

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
For example, the Tenth Amendment is one of the few provisions in the U.S. Constitution where
See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 124 (1941); see also Steven Schwinn, The ACA and the Tenth Amendment, SCOTUS BLOG (Aug. 5,
2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-aca-and-the-tenth-amendment/ (describing the
302

commonly cited as providing a textual foundation for the anti-commandeering doctrine as well as for other
federalism principles. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 77 (1992); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991).
303
See Heller
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render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such
other construction . . . . 304 This distinction between prefatory and operative
clauses, however, is inapplicable to Article 97, which itself would be
rendered superfluous if read merely to restate similar language used in
Article 11. G
following the amendment process and
it
is highly unlikely that it was intended to act as an introduction of any sort.
The language of the provision itself may also be significant in
determining what effect it should be given. Article 97 is unique not only due
to its placement in the constitutional scheme, but also for its command that
fundamental human rig
be held for all time inviolate 305 The Japanese
term
only appears in two other provisions in the 1946 Constitution:
Article 9 and Article 11.306
in the No Religious Test Clause of the U.S. Constitution,307 the language
utilized here also demonstrates an intent that fundamental human rights
deserve some higher status than other constitutional provisions, which can
be revised simply through the processes of Article 96. The significance of
Article 97 may further be evinced by the fact that the LDP Draft eliminates
it entirely.308 The LDP authors apparently recognized that a repeal of Article
97 may be first be necessary to achieve the other proposed curtailments of
fundamental rights in the LDP Draft, such as free speech.309
Although Articles 74 and 75 of the Meiji Constitution explicitly
mention the amendment process whereas Articles 97, 98, and 99 of the
1946 Constitution do not when viewed in context, a strong inference can
be drawn that the same entrenching effect remains. Applying the rule against
superfluity
especially in
304
305
306

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175.
K
art. 97.
See id. art. 9, para. 2 [W]

id.

[E]ternal and

inviolat
307

See U.S. CONST. art. V, § 3; Mader, supra note 194, at 843.
In addition to the removal of Article 97, the LDP Draft heavily alters Articles 11 and 12. See LDP
Draft, supra note 15, arts. 11, 12, 97;
,
REUTERS (May 23, 2013, 7:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-abe-constitution/factbox-keyfacts-about-japans-constitution-proposed-changes-idUSBRE94N04920130524.
309
See LDP Draft, supra note 15
provisions of the
preceding paragraph [recognizing the freedom of expression], engaging in activities with the purpose of
harming the public interest and public order and forming associations to attain this objective shall not be
The LDP appears to try not to draw attention to these changes in the propaganda it has
published for its draft. See, e.g., LDP Announces a New Draft Constitution for Japan, supra note 10.
308
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light of terms connoting permanence and must be given some different
effect than Article 11. The placement of Article 97 in Chapter X also mirrors
the placement of Articles 74 and 75 in relation to the amendment procedures
in the Meiji Constitution. These should not be dismissed as coincidences. In
Alden v. Maine, the U.S. Supreme Court described its process of interpreting
the Eleventh Amendment to broadly recognize the doctrine of sovereign
immunity:
e have looked to history and experience, and the established
order of things, rather than adhering to the mere letter of the Eleventh
310
Amendment
Under this approach, the Court has consistently upheld
falling outside the literal text 311 on the understanding that the
Eleventh Amen
codify[] the traditional understanding
312
Applying a similar reasoning to the Japanese
Constitution, the textual and structural context of Article 97 illustrates a
the limited amendment
process that existed under the Meiji Constitution. By logical extension,
therefore, Articles 98 and 99 also serve this purpose, as all are collectively
contained within Chapter X as
Part IV next explores how
these provisions interact with Article 96 to give physical form to the implicit
limits on the amendment process inherent in the Japanese Constitution.
IV.

IMPLICIT LIMITS ON AMENDING THE AMENDMENT PROCESS
A.

The Supremacy Clause in Article 98 and Its Potential Limits on
Constitutional Amendments

As previously noted, the GHQ drafters were aware of the availability
of explicit entrenchment provisions.313 Examples could also be found in both
the U.S. Constitution and the Meiji Constitution. 314 Contemporaneous
constitutions also include entrenchment provisions for human rights and
other fundamental democratic structures. For example, the German Basic
Law of 1949 explicitly prohibits amendments that would destroy the
rule of law or separation of powers. 315 And yet no explicit limits on the
310
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999) (citations omitted) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 13 14 (1890)).
311
Id. at 727.
312
Id. at 723.
313
See discussion supra Section II.A.
314
See discussion supra Sections II.D.2, III.A.
315
GG art. 79, para. 3.
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amendment power were included in Article 96. It is nevertheless unlikely
that the GHQ or the Japanese citizens who suffered under military rule
would have supported a new constitution that could, as soon as the
Occupation ended, unilaterally be repealed or replaced with the Meiji
Constitution. Rather than the types of substantive amendment limits that
have proliferated in recent history,316 a more likely notion is that the 1946
Constitution inherited a similar form of semi-procedural entrenchment that
existed in the Meiji Constitution. With Article 74 precluding amendment of
the Imperial House Law, and Article 75 prohibiting any amendment while
the Emperor was incapacitated, these procedural hurdles effectively
reinforced the Emperor veto power over amendments.317 While primarily
procedural in nature, these requirements obviously encoded certain
substantive value judgments318
the Meiji Constitution sought to entrench the principles of Imperial
sovereignty and supremacy.319 The Supremacy Clause in Article 98 of the
1946 Constitution, therefore, can be viewed as imposing a similar procedural
barrier to amendments by effectively giving the Constitution itself
a presumptive
veto. In other words, any act of government, including amendments to the
1946 Constitution,320 can
the provisions of Chapter X.
The term contrary is used only in Article 98, 321 although the
underlying Japanese term hansuru is found elsewhere in both Article 18 and
in the Preamble.
perhaps attributable
322
to a simple translation decision, the remaining instance of hansuru in the
316

See, e.g., Roznai, supra note 190, at 4.
See MEIJI K
arts. 73 75.
318
The line between what is procedural and what is substantive is notoriously blurry in many legal
realms. Cf.
317

ntive value judgment or put[] a stamp of
319

Constitution is constructively entrenched against amendment, as no state would voluntarily vote to reduce
its own representation. See Albert, supra note 2, at 662.
320
See discussion supra Section II.B.
321
Some significance can also be drawn from the fact that the language in Article 98 mirrors that in
Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
stitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . anything . . . to the
Contrary
with K
art. 98, para. 1
322
Article 18
K
art. 18. This
language is almost directly transplanted from the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The
text of the second clause in Article 18 literally translated proh
contrary to the
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Preamble is particularly significant given its context. Setting the foundation
for the 1946 Constitution to replace the Meiji Constitution as the law of the
land, the Preamble
reject and revoke
all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith. 323 The
sovereign power resides with the people . . . .

324

Although the Preamble
325
and in this

instance it
Constitution under Article 98. As the Preamble indicates, any act of
government that appears to undermine the principle of popular sovereignty
This seems to confirm Article
98 imposition of
in place of a
which can be
exercised pursuant to the power of judicial review enshrined in Article 81 as
expanded by Article 98 itself. Under this interpretation, t
would include any amendment to the Constitution that stands opposed to or
calls into question the validity of those constitutionally entrenched norms in
Chapter X. In particular, if the ultimate effect of any proposed amendment
would cast doubt on the very principle of popular sovereignty, Article 98
would empower the judiciary to exercise this presumptive
power.
When and how this power comes into play can be clarified by reading the
Supremacy Clause in conjunction with its counterpart in Article 99.
B.
Article 99, the final provision contained in Chapter X, may also be
instrumental in understanding the implicit constitutional limits on amending
the amendment process. The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of
State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the
obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution. 326 Significant here is the
requirement to both respect and uphold the provisions of the
K
art. 18 (emphasis added)
( S]ono i ni hansuru kueki ni fukusaserarenai. ). In this context, hansuru does not require direct conflict
broader understanding. Cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (broadly interpreting
the Thir
323
K
pmbl. (emphasis added).
324
Id.
325
See Hamilton, supra note 242, at 560 n.24.
326
K
art. 99 (emphasis added).
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Constitution. 327 The Japanese term y go
328
although connoting
is
wholly unique to this provision. Nowhere else does the Constitution impose
such a duty.329 For that matter, the Japanese term gimu
does appear in several other locations, but only within Chapter
330
III,
That is to say, the language of
Article 99 more closely resembles that of an individual right than any of the
sekinin) of public officials.331
Some advocates opposed to constitutional revision have interpreted
this provision as precluding government officials from proposing or even
discussing wholesale constitutional revision. 332 While somewhat extreme,
this understanding reflects the reality that public officials are already
subjected by law to oaths of office that prohibit defamatory remarks.333 Such
restrictions on political activity have been routinely upheld against public
workers and court officers,334 although Article 96 clearly contemplates some
ability for politicians to discuss amending the Constitution.335 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court of Japan has said relatively little about Article 99 itself or
whether it is independently enforceable. 336 When the Court does mention
Article 99 in passing, it may be cited as a basic presumption that officials,
including elected members of the Diet, will obey judicial decisions even
327
Japanese scholars have interpreted these terms to essentially mean the same thing. See HIGUCHI
Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1505 (equating both terms with mamoru

Constitution, but only public officials excluding the Emperor must additionally uphold it. See LDP
Draft, supra note 15, art. 99. How courts would treat that difference in language is unclear.
328
, KOTOBANKU, https://kotobank.jp/word/
-652922 (last visited Mar.
Shingai,
kigai kara, kabai mamoru koto.
329
Although Article 26 does use a related term hogo
protection
K
art. 26 (emphasis added).
330
See id. arts. 26 27, 30.
331
See, e.g., id.
shall be collectively responsible
332
See Urabe Noriho,
[The Duty to Respect and Uphold the Constitution],
H
[JAPAN INST. CONST. L.] (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.jicl.jp/urabe/
backnumber/20130221.html; SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 270 (interpreting Article 99 as
HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note
148, at 1507 (noting that, under the limited theory of Article 96, advocating for an amendment exceeding
implicit limitations would not be permissible).
333
See
to wa? [
in Article 99 of the Constitution?], NIPPON K
[JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY] (Mar. 19, 2003),
http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik2/2003-03-19/2003-0319faq.html.
334
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 201 n.63.
335
K
336
See generally HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1503 10.
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those that invalidate legislation as unconstitutional. 337 Most scholars have
generally interpreted this provision as a truism, simply restating the fact that
public officials owe the people as the source of sovereignty under the 1946
Constitution a duty to avoid constitutional errors and violations in carrying
out public affairs. 338 Additionally, Article 99 can be read as imposing a
moral or logical duty on public officials to proactively prevent and resist
activities abhorrent to the Constitution.339
Perhaps the best way to understand the purpose of Article 99 is to
contrast it with the proposed
All people shall respect
this Constitution. Members of the Diet, Ministers of State, judges, and all
other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this
Constitution. 340 The LDP Draft would effectuate two significant changes to
the Constitution, previously only
imposed on public officials, would be extended to all people. This could be
considered particularly problematic in light of other proposed amendments,
such as a completely new provision that would constitutionally create a duty
341
Failure to sing the
national anthem would no longer be an exercise of free speech but a
constitutional violation.342 Second, the LDP Draft would completely exempt
the Emperor from any requirement to uphold the Constitution.343 Although
the LDP Draft purports to maintain the principle of popular sovereignty,
several provisions including this amendment to Article 99 have been
cited as an indication that the LDP is actually seeking to reinstate the Meiji
337
See, e.g.
no.209, 67 M
dissenting), http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/745/083745_hanrei.pdf.

1503,1538
Article 99

is

also

unconstitutional laws. See HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1507 08; Sunakawa, supra note 120,
at 3281 (Okuno & Takahashi, JJ., concurring).
338
Nitta Hiroshi,
[A Comparing
Legal Study on Concrete Method to Defend Constitution], C
[STUD. REGIONAL
POL Y], Feb. 2009, at 19, 22, http://www1.tcue.ac.jp/home1/c-gakkai/kikanshi/ronbun11-4/nitta.pdf;
HIGUCHI Y ICHI ET AL., supra note 148, at 1505.
339
Nitta Hiroshi, supra note 338, at 22.
340
LDP Draft, supra note 15, art. 102 (emphasis added).
341
Id. art. 3; see also Repeta & Jones, supra note 11, at 320
342
Many school districts already have rules that require teachers to stand and sing the national
anthem, and those rules have been upheld as constitutional. See Kyla Ryan, Japan: Controversy Over the
National Anthem, DIPLOMAT (June 22, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/japan-controversy-over-thenational-anthem/.
343
See Repeta & Jones, supra note 11, at 320 (suggesting that this change is tied to elevating the
status of nationalism and national symbols). Although perhaps the Emperor may still fall under the duty for
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ructure.344 Needless to say, no analogous provision
existed in the Meiji Constitution.345
Attempting to synthesize these varying conceptions of Article 99 is no
meager task as is the case with any constitution, many provisions are
intentionally vague to ensure ample flexibility to adapt to unforeseen
circumstances. 346 While the straightforward meaning that follows is that
government officials must obey the Constitution, the inverse proposition is
equally conceivable. That is, any public official, under direction by their
superior or by a co-equal officer or branch of government, can assert Article
99 as an independent right to object to such an unconstitutional directive or,
at least, to seek clarification on its constitutionality from the Supreme
Court.347 Such an interpretation would be in alignment with the scholarly
understanding of Article 99 to impose a duty to avoid causing or failing to
rectify constitutional violations.348 This interpretation can also be applied in
the form of a judicial inference that legislators and other government actors
are presumed to follow the Constitution, and therefore any actions carry a
.
C.

Is Article 96 Itself Implicitly Unamendable or Entrenched
?

Although this Comment argues that Chapter X of the 1946
Constitution is best understood as implicitly limiting the scope of Article 96,
no provision therein appears to prohibit amending the amendment process
itself. Indeed, none of those Articles are themselves explicitly entrenched
against amendment. Given the fact that the drafters chose not to make the
entrenchment provisions explicit, this may reflect a compromise rooted in
344

See Goodman, supra note 2, at 39.
The closest language appears only in the Imperial Rescript on promulgation, which is also
See MEIJI K
pmbl.
s of State,
on Our behalf, shall be held responsible for the carrying out of the present Constitution, and Our present
and future subjects shall forever assume the duty of allegiance to the present Constitution . . . .
346
See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Are We All Living Constitutionalists Now?, in ROBERT W. BENNETT
& LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 165, 173 74 (suggesting that vague
or ambiguous language in the U.S. Constitution was intentionally inserted as compromises, to allow future
generations to decide, or to mollify other constituents); cf. Albert, supra note 173, at 80 82 (discussing
constitutional resilience and the value in constitutions that can adapt to rapidly changing circumstances).
347
See K
art. 81. Of course, seeking clarification in such a manner by violating a directive would
345

jurisdiction in such a case.
348
See Nitta Hiroshi, supra note 338, at 22.
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the desire to emphasize certain constitutional values.349 The first step is to
synthesize the analyses from previous sections into a concrete understanding
of what the implicit entrenchment provisions in Chapter X signify.
Some constitutional scholars argue that entrenchment provisions are
themselves implicitly unamendable. 350 Amar signals that the entrenched
provisions can be amended simply by first amending out the entrenchment
clause and then amending the previously unamendable provision.351 While
others claim there is no need to go through such a formalistic double
amendment process a single amendment can accomplish both. 352 Albert
similarly
and legal continuity, to act as a counterbalance against any constitutional
dismemberment. 353 Under this rule, any amendment or the Constitution
itself
354
There is also some theoretical support for
amendments exceeding the scope of Article V, based on the history of the
Constitutional Convention exceeding its scope of amending the Articles of
Confederation to instead propose an entirely new constitution.355 A similar
historical argument exists in Japan, as the 1946 Constitution far exceeded
the scope of what an amendment could theoretically accomplish under the

349
Given the complex and secretive drafting history and ratification process, a court would likely try
to avoid any over-reliance on previous drafts or contemporary statements. Instead, the text and structure of
the Constitution itself are more likely to guide any determination on the limits of amendments. See
discussion supra Section II.A.
350
See Yaniv Roznai, Amending
, CONST. MAKING & CONST. CHANGE
(Oct. 20, 2014), http://constitutional-change.com/amending-unamendable-provisions/.
351
AMAR, supra note 32, at 292 93; see also Roznai, supra note 350; Albert, supra note 2, at 663
n.75 (positing
352
See Roznai, supra note 350; Linder, supra note 182, at 729 (suggesting that the 1861 Corwin
Amendment, which would have prohibited future amendments from abolishing the institution of slavery,
would nonetheless have been implicitly repealed upon passage of the Thirteenth Amendment).
353
Albert, supra note 173, at 7.
354
Id. at 6. Applying this theory to Japan, Albert theorizes that, because the 1946 Constitution was
enacted via Article 73 of the Meiji Constitution, the Constitution cannot validly impose an additional
popular referendum requirement
-thirds
vote in both Houses. Id. at 76. Of course, because the Meiji Constitution itself was promulgated by Imperial
Order, under this rule of mutuality, the Emperor could unilaterally rescind both the Meiji and 1946
Constitutions at the same time. Albert does attempt to distance himself from such an extreme proposition
sary
predicate for public acceptance of any amendment, much less any new constitution. Id. at 77.
355
See Richard Albert,
, CATO UNBOUND (Dec. 11, 2015),
https://www.cato-unbound.org/2015/12/11/richard-albert/americas-unamendable-constitution.
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Meiji Constitution. If an entirely new constitution can be enacted under the
disguise of an amendment,356 do entrenchment provisions even matter?
Once again, Japanese courts are likely to adopt a middle-ground
approach no provision is itself unamendable, but any barrier entrenching
certain provisions against amendment must itself first be explicitly repealed.
But how should courts textually justify such a position? When a new statute
or amendment is enacted, under the doctrine of implied repeal, any older
provisions in conflict with the newly enacted law become legally inoperable,
even if not explicitly repealed.357 For example, the Twenty-First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution explicitly repealed the Eighteenth Amendment,
effectively ending the practice of Prohibition.358 In contrast, the Thirteenth
Amendment did not explicitly repeal anything, and yet is understood to have
effectively nullified the Three-Fifths and Fugitive Slave Clauses. 359 U.S.
courts generally employ a very strong presumption against implied repeal in
statutory interpretation cases, but only when conflict is avoidable. 360 How
356
See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 261 (comparing such an eventuality to the 1946
Constitution and suggesting that, so long as such an amendment remained popular with the people, it would
357
See generally Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals,
92 CAL. L. REV. 487 (2004) (providing an overview of the doctrine of implied repeal as well as recent
examples). The doctrine is conceptualized as a corollary to the later-enacted-statute rule, which requires
courts to give preference to the more recent statute if it conflicts with an older one.
Id. at 498 n.53; see also Sunakawa, supra note 120, at 3272 (Kotani, J., concurring) (noting the common
rule that subsequent laws are accorded priority and yet reasoning that treaties should have priority even if a
subsequent law is in conflict). Although more commonly used in reference to statutes, the doctrine also
applies to constitutional amendments. See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and
the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO.
L.J. 259, 275 (2004).
358
See U.S. CONST.
But cf. Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without
Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST.
COMMENTARY 217, 219 20 (1995) (arguing that the inartful drafting of Section 2 of the Twenty-First
Amendment effectively transforms individual violations of state alcohol laws into constitutional violations).
359
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Chin, supra note 357, at 277; cf. Tribe, supra note 358, at 219
n.12 (commenting that the Court exceeded what was necessary for an implied repeal by interpreting the
Eleventh Amendment as extending beyond its literal text to reinvigorate state sovereign immunity).
360
See, e.g.
showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the

however, may involve intrinsic value judgments and vary highly depending on the reviewing judge. See
Petroski, supra note 357, at 494 (noting the difficulties in determining whether two statutes are truly
irreconcilable). Especially when it comes to the Reconstruction Amendments, scholars regularly debate
whether or not an implied repeal has occurred and to what extent. See, e.g., Malinda L. Seymore, The
Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 927, 986 (2005) (arguing that the Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is irreconcilable with the Natural-Born Citizen Clause); cf. Michael Stokes
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment,

300

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 28 NO. 1

Japanese courts might resolve such a dilemma is less clear,361 but when these
general legal principles are viewed in light of
constitutional
presumption of an intent to respect the Constitution,362 the combined effect
should require a court to reject any interpretation of an amendment that
would result in the presumptively unintended implied repeal of other
constitutional provisions. If conflict is absolutely unavoidable and any
application of the doctrine of implied repeal nevertheless produces results
under Article 98, then the Supreme Court may
have no choice but to reject such an amendment. This presumption against
the implied repeal of constitutional provisions would be strongest possibly
insurmountable if the conflicting language forms part of the fundamental
principles of the 1946 Constitution entrenched in Chapter X.363
To paraphrase, Article 99 would require the reviewing court to
assume that a challenged constitutional
364
365
while not
103 YALE L.J. 677, 699 703 & nn.79, 88 (1993) (noting that the Corwin Amendment, which would have
entrenched slavery, may not be completely irreconcilable with the Thirteenth Amendment, and therefore, is
still potentially available for ratification via the same process as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment).
361
Although Japan follows the general legal rule that a later-enacted statute is given priority when in
direct conflict with an older statute, see discussion supra note 357, having never amended its Constitution,
the author can only speculate that Japanese courts will look to U.S. experience for guidance. A similar
controversy has arisen regarding how this legal principle might interact with a recent LDP proposal to add a
-Defense Force in the Constitution.
Compare Igarashi Jin, Abe 9[We Must Face the
Dangers in
Plan to Amend Article 9], BLOGOS (Sept. 15, 2017, 9:23 AM), http://blogos.com/article/
246324/ (suggesting that the proposal, as a later-enacted law, would effectively nullify Paragraphs 1 and 2
of Article 9), with Momochi Akira,
[
Being
Acknowledged by the
], SANKEI N
(Jan. 23, 2018, 11:00
AM), https://www.sankei.com/column/news/180123/clm1801230004-n1.html (arguing that the provisions
would not be in direct conflict, and therefore the later-enacted rule would be inapplicable).
362

support
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (emphasis added), and yet the doctrine of implied
repeal has regularly been applied to amendments, see Chin, supra note 357, at 276 (listing examples). One
argument to support potentially treating the Constitution of Japan differently rests in the historical context
surrounding promulgation and adoption of the two constitutions. The U.S. Constitution came about from
the failure of the Articles of Confederation to provide enough power and flexibility to the central
government for it to properly function. See AMAR, supra note 32, at 25 29. In contrast, the 1946
Constitution arose from the inability of the Meiji Constitution to constrain the central government and
prevent the various abuses of power that resulted in World War II. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, note 24, at 12
counsels against permitting
amendments that would impliedly repeal fundamental pillars of the Japanese Constitution.
363
Cf. Petroski, supra note 357, at 527 28 (proposing a new approach to the presumption against
implied repeal, with a weaker presumption if the older statute is obsolete or has generated no reliance
interests, and a much stronger presumption for statutes codifying important rights).
364
K
art. 99.
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366
impairing
any
irreconcilable conflict would therefore be unintended and should be avoided
at all costs.367 However, an affirmative intent to repeal any specific Article
even the entrenchment provisions in Chapter X if duly ratified by twothirds of both Houses and a majority of the public via referendum, must
override any such presumption. For example, should the LDP seek to water
down the individual rights in Chapter III implicitly entrenched by Article 97,
the entrenchment provision itself must first be amended out. Likewise, in
order to amend many of the provisions on the Emperor in Chapter I, Article
99, and quite possibly Article 98, must first be amended to explicitly remove
support for the fundamental pillar of popular sovereignty. Where the conflict
is not as direct, the Court would still be justified in avoiding any implied
consent.

Now that the general contours of the implicit limits on Article 96 have
been laid out, the next question is what this means for attempts to amend the
amendment process itself. More specifically, what arguments grounded in
the Constitution
would effectively preclude the LDP from first
lowering the vote threshold in Article 96 and then removing the remaining
Chapter X entrenchments under that lower threshold?368 The two-thirds vote
barrier is itself significant, as a contextual analysis illustrates that the same
supermajority requirement is employed elsewhere in the 1946 Constitution.
For example, Article 56 provides the basic threshold for passing regular
legislation in the Diet. The Article imposes a quorum requirement consisting
one-third or more of total membership
ll matters shall
be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present, except as
elsewhere provided in the Constitution 369
-thirds
370

365

Id. art. 97.
Id. art. 98.
367
Such a strong presumption against implied repeal also appears to have also existed under the Meiji
ified by the Imperial
House Law, MEIJI K
er directly or
indirectly bring about any alteration of the present Constitution, HIROBUMI I , supra note 288, at 156.
366

368

reduce the amendment threshold from a two-thirds vote to a simple majority in both Houses, as the 1946
Constitution itself was passed under a two-thirds vote. However, that same rule would permit abolishing
the referendum requirement which was not employed when the 1946 Constitution was adopted or more.
See Albert, supra note 173, at 76.
369
K
art. 56 (emphasis added).
370
Id. art. 55
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Most
importantly, a two-thirds vote in the House of Representatives can enact a
bill into law over the objection of the House of Councillors.373 By raising the
threshold against expelling duly elected members, the Constitution seeks to
By
doing the same for public debate in the Diet, the Constitution furthers
interests in transparency to ensure that the public can hold their
representatives accountable in the next election. And by allowing the House
the House that most directly reflects public perception.374 The significance
of these supermajority provisions becomes even more apparent when
compared to the Meiji Constitution, which only imposed a supermajority
requirement for the amendment process,375 and in fact proscribed any bill
from being reconsidered if either of the two Houses had rejected it in that
session.376 These supermajority provisions, therefore, protect an underlying
value that was not recognized under the Meiji Constitution namely,
popular sovereignty. That value forms the core of Articles 98 and 99.
Furthermore, reducing the amendment barrier to a simple majority
would directly cast in doubt the very supremacy of the Constitution. If the
Constitution is
easier to amend the Constitution than it would be to enact regular
legislation otherwise, the Constitution is no longer supreme. Any of
those actions that would still require a supermajority vote would then exist
on a higher plane than a mere amendment. Would a bill passed over the
objections of the House of Councillors via Article 59 be superior to an
amendment? Alternatively, could the subsequent passage of a national
referendum by simple majority thereby transform any regular law into a
constitutional amendment? These questions reach even more absurd results
after factoring in the doctrine of implied repeal. With those Articles
providing supermajority barriers in irreconcilable conflict with the LDP
371

Id. art. 57, para. 1.
Id. art. 58, para. 2.
373
Id. art. 59, para. 2.
374
This is further evidenced by the fact that the House of Representatives serves shorter, four-year
terms, and can be dissolved in order to immediately poll public opinion. Id. art. 45; see also SHIGENORI
MATSUI, supra note 24, at 100 03 (noting that Prime Ministers have repeatedly invoked Article 7 to
dissolve the House of Representatives, even though the Constitution contains no provision allowing for
immediate dissolution).
375
MEIJI K
art. 73, para. 2.
376
Id. art. 39.
372
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impliedly repeal Article 98 thereby destroying the entire constitutional
structure or to impliedly repeal the other supermajority requirements. If a
two-thirds vote is no longer required for amending the nominally
for the House of
Representatives to pass a regular law over the House of Councillors.
Without an effective veto power, of what use would the House of
Councillors be? Amending Article 96 would logically entail the abolishment
of the bicameral system a system specifically reinserted by the Japanese
drafters prior to ratification of the 1946 Constitution. Would a two-thirds
vote still be necessary before ejecting duly elected members? Or could a
simple majority rewrite the rules of conduct, then summarily expel all
members of any opposition party? Because these supermajority requirements
are so closely tied to the principle of popular sovereignty, lowering the
amendment threshold would effectively mark the first step on returning
Japan to authoritarian rule. 377 These are far from abstract comparisons
Japanese bar associations 378 and many others in Japan 379 have recognized
these incongruities and voiced their opposition to amending Article 96.
377

Cf. MCNELLY, supra note 114, at 74 (describing the view of some GHQ drafters that not including

counter
rights. See, e.g., A New
, ECONOMIST (Apr. 20,
2017),
https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/04/20/a-new-bill-reveals-the-japanese-governmentsauthoritarian-terrorism bill); Bill Powell, How
, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 29, 2015, 6:33 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/2015/10/09/shinzo-abe-critics-fear-militaristic-japan-future-377715.html
(noting similarities between Prime M
Prime Minister).
378
See, e.g.,
of Bar
ni igi ari!! [We Object to Amending Article 96!!] (May 2013), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/
publication/booklet/data/constitution.pdf; Irome Yoshio,
kanwa ni ha
[
Amending the Constitution in Article 96], NARA BENGOSHI KAI [NARA B. ASS N] (June 17, 2013),
http://www.naben.or.jp/seimei_1615.html; Iwasaki Atsushi,
[
Amending the Constitution in Article 96], K
BENGOSHI KAI [K
B. ASS N] (Aug. 27, 2013),
https://kochiben.or.jp/

/;
[Resolution Against Relaxing the Requirements for Amending
the Constitution in Article 96], SHIZUOKA BENGOSHI KAI [SHIZUOKA B. ASS N] (June 7, 2013),
https://www.s-bengoshikai.com/bengoshikai/seimei-ketsugi/k13-6kenpou96/.
379
See, e.g.,
[What is the Kyoto Article 96 Association?], K
96KAI [KYOTO ARTICLE 96 ASS N], http://kyoto.96jo.net/?page_id=13 (last visited Aug. 24, 2018);
96kaisei subeki desu ka? Bengoshi 48[
], BENGO4.COM (June 2, 2013,
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directly runs afoul of the principles of constitutional supremacy and popular
sovereignty entrenched in Chapter X. Because reducing the vote threshold
for amendments under Article 96 would create an irreconcilable conflict
with the fundamental norms in Articles 98 and 99, the Court would be
justified in ruling that the proposed amendment exceeded the implicit limits
placed on Article 96 itself through the provisions of Chapter X. Nevertheless,
what the Court would do next with such an unconstitutional amendment is
difficult to predict. There are, perhaps, several alternatives short of striking
down the amendment in its entirety that the Court may prefer.380 One option
would be to declare a state of unconstitutionality 381 without declaring the
amendment itself void and to direct the Diet to rectify its error within a
reasonable time.382 In the situation of an amendment to Article 96 itself, the
Court could theoretically direct the replacement to comply with the original
vote thresholds in Article 96 and enjoin the adoption of any other
amendments in the meantime.383 Another option would be for the Court to
find the ratification process procedurally inadequate.384 Because Article 96
stipulates that
385
any amendment must fully comply with those
3:05 PM), https://www.bengo4.com/other/1146/1287/n_377/; Press Rel
Article 96] (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www5.sdp.or.jp/policy/policy/constitution/images/130321.PDF; Reizei
Akihiko,
[Thoughts on the Problems with Amending Article
96], NEWSWEEK JAPAN (Mar. 6, 2013, 1:42 PM), https://www.newsweekjapan.jp/reizei/2013/03/96.php.
380
Recall that the Supreme Court of Japan is notoriously conservative and reluctant to even strike
down regular legislation. See sources cited supra note 30.
381
Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 2013, Hei 25 (gy
tsu) 209, 67 MINSH
1503, 1526,
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_jp/745/083745_hanrei.pdf (
. . . ni hansuru j tai see
also Toko Sekiguchi,
Unconstitutional State but Not Unconstitutional, WALL STREET
J. (Nov. 20, 2013, 9:43 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/11/20/japans-elections-inunconstitutional-state-but-notight
disparity between electoral districts in the 2012 elections).
iken j tai
Tsuji, Vote Value Disparity and Judicial Review in Japan, REVISTA DE INVESTIGAÇÕES CONSTITUCIONAIS
[J. CONST. RES.], May Aug. 2018, at 57.
382
Notably, this is the approach the Court has repeatedly employed when dealing with disparity in the
rtionment cases. See Shigenori Matsui, supra note
30, at 1391 92; Haley, supra note 30, at 1477 83; Yuichiro Tsuji, supra note 381, at 78 85.
383

unconstitutional does not immediately strike down the law in question that duty generally lies with the
Diet. See SHIGENORI MATSUI, supra note 24, at 145 (discussing the unconstitutional parricide law, which
remained in place for over twenty years as the Diet failed to amend or abolish it).
384
Recall that the Court expressed no qualms about reviewing the ratification process of the security
treaty in the Sunakawa case. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
385
K
art. 96, para. 1.
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procedures as well. The Diet finally enacted a National Referendum Law in
2007,386 which sets a time period for discussing any proposed amendment
after passage in the Diet387 and establishes a National Referendum Public
Relations Council388 to direct outreach and inform citizens of the proposed
s effect. 389 If the voting public was not fully informed that
ratification of the contested amendment would result in the implied repeal of
other fundamental constitutional provisions, the Court could find the
amendment procedurally invalid and require a new referendum for explicitly
authorizing repeal of those provisions. Finally, the Court may be inclined to
apply the strong presumption against implied repeal at its apex when
potentially facing the implied repeal of a fundamental principle such as
popular sovereignty to interpret an amendment in such a way as to avoid
any direct conflict.390 What an amendment to Article 96 would have to look
like in order to pass constitutional muster is not readily imaginable.
However, one possibility is that the Court will interpret such an amendment
not as repealing the existing amendment process but as creating a new one

386

the Constitution of Japan], Law No. 51 of 2007.
387
Id. art. 2, para. 1 (directing the public referendum to be conducted between 60 and 180 days after
the Diet approves an amendment).
388
Id.
, Law No. 79 of 1947 arts. 102
11, para. 1 (establishing a Council composed of members from both Houses once an amendment is
proposed).
389
See, e.g., Law No. 51 of 2007, art. 14 (directing the Council to prepare and publish an easily
understandable explanation of the proposed amendment, including arguments for and against, as well as a
comparison with current law in a fair and unbiased manner). For an overview of the public announcement
process, see
[National Referendum System: Public
Announcement, Information, and Referendum Activities], S
[MINISTRY INTERNAL AFF. & COMM.],
http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/kokumin_touhyou/syuchi.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
390
See Petroski, supra note 357
cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393 (1821)
[T]he duty of the Court . . . [is] to construe the constitution as to give effect to both
provisions, as far as it is possible to reconcile them, and not to permit their seeming repugnancy to destroy
y be so strong as to justify almost rewriting the
conflicting provisions to reach reconciliation. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and
Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 556 n.141 (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254,
304
in part and concurring in part
But cf. Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The
, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 437, 466 (2009) (arguing that the
doctrine of implied repeal amounts to rewriting a statute); Petroski, supra note 357, at 512 n.118 (listing
criticisms of implied repeal).
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and then limiting its scope to technical corrections and other minor
changes.391
In summation, in order to amend Article 96, the LDP must first find a
way to circumvent Articles 98 and 99 without subsequently destroying the
entire constitutional structure in the process. That is not to say Article 96 is
completely unamendable. If the Diet expressed an unmistakably clear intent
to abolish Articles 98 and 99, and a majority of the public approved, those
entrenchments must fall, leaving nothing to stand in the way of amending
Article 96. Quite possibly, the only way this could be accomplished is by
repealing and replacing the entire Constitution via
endment.
Given the inability of passing any amendment to the 1946 Constitution thus
far, it is highly unlikely that this would be a viable method. The whole
reason why the LDP has focused on amending Article 96 is because it would
be much more difficult to attempt complete constitutional revision with the
supermajority barrier intact. As it stands, under this structural understanding
approach of first amending Article 96 to then easily dismantle the remainder
of the Constitution is effectively foreclosed.
V.

CONCLUSION

Every constitutional regime has a rich and complex history this is
particularly true of the Constitution of Japan. Although simplifying the legal
analysis may allow conclusions to be drawn across cultures, attempting to do
so may ultimately
.
Not every constitution is the same nor should they be treated identically. As
an expression
cultural identity and societal norms. Any constitutional analysis, therefore,
requires an equally critical lens.392 When dealing with theoretical questions
391
Thereby creating an explicit distinction betw
accomplishable through the original amendment process in Article 96. This would correspond to analogous
distinctions contained in other constitutions. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Such a solution
would incidentally turn many of the ultraconservative arguments for amending the Constitution against
themselves. See, e.g.,
[Collected Documents
of Constitutional Problems 12 Chapters for Understanding the Current Constitution], NIPPON KAIGI (July
11, 2000), https://www.nipponkaigi.org/opinion/archives/882 (listing several minor translation errors in the
Japanese Constitution as evidence for the need to lower the amendment threshold).
392
Although this Comment reflects an attempt to step into the shoes of a Japanese court to analyze
the implicit limitations on Article 96 under first principles, there is no guarantee that actual Japanese courts
will reach the same conclusions. The author unabashedly relies on U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting
the U.S. Constitution to draw certain conclusions about the Japanese Constitution. This analysis may come
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this high up on the legal hierarchy, however, the answers are necessarily
complicated the relationship between constitutions and amendments has
always been, and may forever remain, a blurry line.
Employing a contextual analysis of both the Meiji and 1946
Constitutions, this Comment concludes that Chapter X is the repository of
those implicit limits. The three fundamental pillars therein consist of respect
for fundamental human rights (Article 97), constitutional supremacy (Article
98), and popular sovereignty (Article 99). For the many scholars who have
relied on the Preamble to argue that the pacifism principle is also implicitly
entrenched, this may come as an unsatisfactory result.393 However, as the
be cognizable as an individual right under Articles 9 and 13, which would at
entrenchment. Regardless, as the analysis in Part IV illustrates, any
amendment to Article 9 must be conducted in the Diet under the current
supermajority threshold and then submitted to public referendum the LDP
Nevertheless, Article 9 may be constructively unamendable.394 Given
the circumstances in Japan where only a minority of the public supports
amending the Constitution,395 the public has given supermajority control in
out differently if the reviewing judges are more familiar with German constitutional law, or if they attempt
to reach a conclusion based solely upon the dearth of Japanese Supreme Court cases. Japanese scholars
have nonetheless argued for years that implicit limits on the amendment process must exist this Comment
therefore seeks to logically tether those arguments to the text and structure of the Constitution.
393
Professor Miyazawa
MILLER, supra note 9, at 274, also rejected the notion that amending Article 9 would exceed the scope of
Article 96, but suggested that popular sovereignty would, see Inomata K
et al., supra note 215, at 172.
394
Constructive unamendability refers to a prolonged political climate where amendments are a
practical impossibility due to the inability of proponents to meet the requisite vote thresholds. See Richard
Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States, 67 SUP. CT. L. REV. 181, 182
(2014). Although Albert discusses constructive unamendability in regard to the Equal Suffrage Clause in
the U.S. Constitution, in Albert, supra note 2, at 662, he stops short of applying it to the situation in Japan.
395
See
,
JAPAN TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/01/14/national/politics-diplomacy/
opposition-revising-constitution-grows-55-kyodo-survey/. Popular support for amending Article 96 also
falls far short of the necessary threshold. See Aramaki Hiroshi & Masaki Miki,
[Pros and Cons Running Neck and Neck on Constitutional
], H
[NHK
MONTHLY REP. ON BROADCAST RES.], July 2015, at 38, 46 http://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/
research/report/2015_07/20150702.pdf (reporting that only 18% of respondents supported revising Article
enough, Emperor
and the Prime

Minister,

N.Y.

T IMES

(Aug.

15,

2016),

See Norihiro Kato, The Emperor
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/
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both Houses to a party renowned for its revisionist goals 396 any
amendment in the near future is highly unlikely. So long as the 1.5-party
system persists and Japanese voters have no viable alternatives, 397 the
political process alone is not necessarily guaranteed to protect the interests
of the people. Thankfully, Article 96 also requires the public to directly
weigh in on any proposed revisions. More often than not, constructive
unamendability is less the result of particular rights attaining some level of
popular support398 than it is political impasse due to partisan bickering.399
Due to the 1.5-party system, however, the type of constructive
unamendability at issue in Japan is of a different kind altogether.
II, if
the 1946 Constitution reverting Japanese sovereignty from the Emperor to
the people was a viable amendment under Article 73 of the Meiji
of the 1946 Constitution must be
an available recourse under Article 96. It could be argued that this historical
exception is limited only to similar revolutionary circumstances under which
the 1946 Constitution was adopted. 400 Furthermore, because the adoption
process complied not only with Article 73 but also with Articles 74 and 75,
one could claim that
entrenchment provisions in Chapter X. However, one must concede that
there is no barrier in legality or legitimacy to prevent a complete
08/15/opinion/the-emperor-and-the-prime-minister.html; Ernils Larsson, Gap Widens Between the LDP
, E. ASIA F. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/04/08/gapwidens-between-the-ldp-and-japans-liberal-emperor/.
396
See Tomohiro Osaki,
nal
Revision, JAPAN T IMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/19/national/politicsdiplomacy/shinzo-abe-calls-japans-rebirth-2020-along-constitutionalof revising the Constitution within a few years). According to a survey after the 2017 election, 80% of
elected representatives even those not in the LDPsupported amending the
constitution, and 52% were in favor of clarifying the SelfVOTE
2017: Constitutional Revision Backed by Over 80% of Lower House, ASAHI SHIMBUN (Oct. 23, 2017, 4:05
PM), http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201710230048.html.
397
See Gerald Curtis,
, E. ASIA F. (Apr. 30, 2017),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/04/30/japans-democratic-party-doomed-to-opposition/; Ken Victor
Leonard Hijino,
, NIPPON.COM (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00361/ (discussing the proliferation of small parties splintering off
prior to elections, only to disappear or remerge with the LDP).
398
Aside from popular support, other factors have also led to the constructive unamendability of
Article 9, such as a desire to focus on economic recovery. See Martin, supra note 9, at 329 30. However,
those factors that existed during the Cold War have all but abated.
399
Of course, a near-identical climate rendering constitutional amendments a practical impossibility
can also be said to exist in the United States. See Albert, supra note 355.
400
Cf. Albert, supra note 173, at 5 7 (discussing the rule of mutuality).
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constitutional revision, assuming the literal commands of Article 96 as it
currently stands are followed. Indeed, who would have standing to challenge
At most, this historical precedent suggests
that the source of sovereignty the Emperor under the Meiji Constitution,
and the people under the 1946 Constitution must be fully aware of and
explicitly consent to all changes resulting from any amendment. Textual and
structural arguments have their limits, and this Comment attempts only to
pave the pathway for a text-based understanding of the implicit limits on
Article 96. The concept of popular sovereignty means that the public must
ultimately decide,
ambitions and popular opinion on the need for constitutional revision,
hopefully this debate will remain in the realm of hypothetical speculation.

